International Studies Quarterly

International Studies Quarterly (2014) **58**, 158–173

Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order[1]

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This essay proposes a new theoretical framework for analyzing the rise of China and its impact on Asian security order. While the rise of China is reshaping Asia's military balance, the region has also witnessed equally important and longer-term changes, especially economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and domestic politics. The implications of these changes are not fully accounted for by the different types of security orders proposed by analysts to describe the implications of China's rise, such as anarchy, hierarchy, hegemony, concert, and community. This essay presents an alternative conceptualization of Asian security order, termed consociational security order (CSO) that draws from different theoretical lenses: defensive realism, institutionalism, and especially consociational theory in comparative politics. Specifying the conditions that make a CSO stable or unstable, the essay then examines the extent to which these conditions can be found in Asia today. Aside from offering a distinctive framework for analyzing China's rise, the CSO framework also offers an analytic device for policymakers and analysts in judging trends and directions in Asian security.

The end of the Cold War and the rise of China have provoked widely divergent views about Asia's future security order. Some see the region heading toward major conflict and blame it on Asia's lack of European-style pacifying mechanisms of deep regional integration, multilateral institutions, and shared democratic politics. Asia's future may thus be likened to Europe's nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century past, a multipolar rivalry ending in two catastrophic wars. Another pessimistic view compares China's ascent to America's in the nineteenth century. Like the United States' pursuit of regional expansion and the Monroe Doctrine in the Western hemisphere, this view foresees China seeking a regional hegemony over its neighbors. On a cautiously optimistic note, some analysts foresee a balance of power order emerging in Asia, managed either by a concert of great powers or a Sino-US condominium (G-2). More optimistically, China's ascent is seen as reviving a benignly hierarchal regional order in East Asia under Chinese primacy that would bring in shared prosperity and peace. The most optimistic scenario raises the prospect of a regional community, in which economic integration, multilateral institutions, and shared norms and identity remove the danger of war.

In this essay, I outline a different type of regional security order for Asia, one that differs not only from the images of a Hobbesian anarchy, but also from the benign visions of a Confucian hierarchy or a Kantian community.[2] My perspective rests on two central arguments. The first is that while the rise of China is clearly reshaping the distribution of power in Asia, the region has also witnessed equally important and long-term changes to other determinants of security and stability. These changes, whose beginnings predate the rise of China, can be discerned by comparing Asia's security environment in the immediate aftermath of World War II and that of now. In the former period, Asian security was shaped by economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism. These have gradually but unmistakably given way to market liberalism and economic interdependence, security multilateralism (coexisting with US-centric bilateralism), and growing domestic political pluralism. Together, they create those very mitigating factors for anarchy that the region was found to be wanting by the pessimists in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War's end and question the relevance of thinking about Asia's future security in terms of Europe's, America's, or Asia's own pasts.

Second, I do not believe that these changes, despite being consistent with the liberal theories of peace, would usher in a pluralistic security community in Asia, in which war becomes "unthinkable." The domestic (liberal-democratic) and international (integration) ingredients required for a Kantian peace in Asia would fall short. But they have the potential to constrain power maximizing behavior on the part of China on the one hand, and extreme balancing/containment postures on the part of the United States and its allies, on the other. Moreover, they would limit China's capacity to develop and legitimize a Sino-centric regional order (whether coercive

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[1] The author thanks T. V. Paul, Norrin Ripsman, Brian Pollins, John Ravenhill, William Tow, John Oneal, John Owen, Dale Copeland, Brian Job, David Kang, Iain Johnston, and Muthiah Alagappa for comments and suggestions on the theme of this article. For research assistance, the author is grateful especially to Shanshan Wang, a doctoral student at the School of International Service (SIS), American University, and to Erica Seng and Goueun Lee at SIS. The author also thanks the organizers of seminars at the University of Birmingham, U.K.; Zhejiang University, China; Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University; U.S.; the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia, Singapore; and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore, for allowing him to present his views to a stimulating audience.

[2] These scenarios are not exhaustive but are among the most debated of those advanced by analysts.

Acharya, Amitav. (2014) Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order. *International Studies Quarterly*, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12084

Monroe Doctrine-like or a "benign" order similar to the old tributary system) and would prevent the development of a Sino-US duopoly or a multilateral Asian Concert system dominated by the great powers while marginalizing its weaker states. The purpose of this essay is to sketch out such a type of possible regional order in Asia, which I call a consociational security order (CSO).[3]

In the following sections, I sketch out a theory of consociational security orders (CSOs), identify what makes them stable or unstable, and use this framework to analyze Asia's emerging security order. The next section outlines five main scenarios of conflict and order that have been suggested for Asia and discuss their limitations. Next, I elaborate the idea of CSO, differentiate it from other types of security orders, and discuss the conditions that need to be in place to make such an order possible. Then, I elaborate on the key changes occurring in Asia's long-term drivers of security. In reviewing the growing trend toward economic interdependence, multilateral institutions, and domestic politics (increasing democratization) in the region, I also assess how these changes impact Asia's security order, and whether and to what extent they may be shaping the prospects for the emergence of an Asian CSO.

Table 1 provides a brief snapshot of five main scenarios of Asian security order and their limitations. It is noteworthy that these perspectives focus either on power ("anarchy," "hegemony," and concert/condominium) or on culture/identity ("hierarchy" and "community"), as the basis of Asia's security order. Theories of domestic politics have been rarely employed. Yet, approaches derived from domestic politics can be very useful in analyzing Asian security order. And here, the theory that is especially relevant is not Democratic Peace, which concerns the relative absence of war among democracies, or why democracies avoid war among one another, but consociationalism, which concerns how ethnically diverse or "divided societies" can achieve stability (Cannon 1982). Asia, a region of tremendous cultural and political diversity, lends itself to the lens of consociational theory. Although widely debated among comparative politics scholars (Apter 1961; Lijphart 1962, 1977; Daalder 1974; Dekmejian 1978; Ganesan 1997; Lustick 1997),[4] consociational theory has been generally ignored in the international relations literature.[5] Yet, the theory identifies several conditions for achieving stability (Bogaards 1998) that are relevant for international relations scholars interested in understanding the requirements for regional and international security order. Moreover, these conditions resonate with IR theories, especially liberalism, defensive realism, and institutionalism, thereby creating an eclectic framework for the study of Asian security order.

[3] Order in this essay refers to the absence of system-destroying conflict, such as major power war, rather than absence of competition among nations per se. This echoes the notion of stability as defined by Deutsch and Singer as "the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur. And from the more limited perspective of the individual nations, stability would refer to the probability of their continued political independence and territorial integrity without any significant probability of becoming engaged in a 'war for survival'" (Deutsch and Singer 1964). For further discussion of regional order, see Alagappa (2003), chapter titled "The Study of International Order: An Analytical Framework."

[4] For critical views, see Barry (1975a,b).

[5] For exceptions, see Taylor (1990); Chryssochoou (1994); Bogaards and Crepaz (2002).

Consociational Security Order: Definition and Enabling Conditions

To clarify the notion of a CSO, I offer a simple definition and differentiate it from other types of security orders. A consociational security order (CSO) is a relationship of mutual accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves each group's relative autonomy and prevents the hegemony of any particular group/s. CSOs differ from other types of security orders more familiar to international relations scholars: hegemony, concert/condominium, and community (Table 2).

First, a CSO is different from a hegemonic security order. In the latter, only one power calls the shots, and balancing declines. Security management mechanisms, such as multilateral institutions, may exist, but they are created, maintained, and thoroughly dominated by the hegemon. Moreover, hegemonic orders seek to exclude other great powers by establishing and enforcing a sphere of influence, as was the case with the US Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. By contrast, a key purpose of consociations is to avoid hegemony. "Rather than duality or hegemony of one group over others, multiplicity is preferred" (Dekmejian 1978).

Second, a CSO may be differentiated from a concert and its truncated version, a great power condominium. A concert is principally an arrangement in which great powers collectively assume the role of managing order to the exclusion of weaker states, which are thoroughly marginalized. While a consociation has its basis in an elite cartel, the dominant groups work with the weaker elements to manage political order. A CSO may be seen as a half-way house between a community and a concert. In a concert system, great powers cooperate to jointly manage international order and preserve stability. The relevant model here is the European concert system, which, involving the major powers of the day, assumed the primary responsibility for managing Europe's security problems and sought to "develop European solutions to European problems" (Elrod 1976). The system worked well between 1815 and 1823 but declined thereafter (prompting theoretical arguments regarding the durability of a concert approach in peacetime), suffering an eventual collapse with the Crimean War of 1854.

Third, a CSO is different from a community. The key attributes of a community are "trust, friendship, complementarity, and responsiveness" (Haas 1973: 116). The most relevant example of community in international relations, the "security community," is distinguished by deep levels of trust and collective identification ("we-feeling") that renders war unthinkable (Deutsch 1961: 98; Adler and Barnett 1998). A CSO has no natural sense of such identity or feeling. Cultural diversity, state sovereignty, and national autonomy remain important. A CSO does not make war unthinkable, nor does it abolish balancing behavior. A CSO is thus a "mixed" approach to political order, where competitive and cooperative behavior exists side by side, and the group holds together by a desire for avoiding system collapse. Competition is controlled for the sake of common survival.

How do CSOs engender stability? Drawing upon theories of both comparative politics and international relations, I identify four enabling conditions: interdependence, equilibrium, institutions under shared leadership, and elite restraint.

Interdependence among states helps to offset the centrifugal elements of cultural difference and animosity

TABLE 1. Alternative Scenarios for Asia's Future

Scenario	*Description*	*Counter-arguments*
Anarchy	Asia's future could be Europe's past, specifically German expansion and great power competition leading to world wars. Asia is "ripe for rivalry" because it lacks Europe's conflict-mitigating forces of economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and shared democracy.	Major differences between Europe's past and Asia's present, including the absence of colonial competition among the Asian powers; Underestimates the presence in Asia of the mitigating factors of anarchy–economic interdependence and regional institutions whose density has grown markedly in past decades; Multipolar systems as might obtain in Asia are more stable because the would-be aggressor cannot be sure about its countervailing coalition; Deterrence is easier in multipolarity than bipolarity, because there are more states that can join together to confront an especially aggressive state with overwhelming force.
Hegemony	China would impose a "Monroe doctrine" over Asia, excluding the United States.	Differences in the regional historical context between America's past and Asia's present—the US Monroe Doctrine did not face contenders as Britain and France were constrained by their mutual rivalry; China today is much more interdependent with its neighbors than the United States was with its own during the Monroe Doctrine.
Hierarchy	A benign Chinese dominance as prevailed under its tributary system. When China was prosperous and powerful, Asia was stable and peaceful.	The tributary order did not have to contend with the United States and a strong Japan; It was not as benign as claimed since the fifteenth-century voyages of Ming Admiral Zheng He involved coercion and force; China's authoritarian political system and the interdependent structure of transnational production in Asia prevents the emergence and a Sino-centric regional order .
Concert/ Condominium	A managed balance of power system, either a multilateral concert of major powers, or a Sino-US duopoly (condominium); one such scenario posits China and the United States dominating the Asian heartland and maritime spheres, respectively.	A club of great powers would be opposed by less powerful actors, such as ASEAN the current leader of Asian regionalism, and would thus lack legitimacy. Concerts emerge *after* a major power war, which is not the case with Asia now. Concerts or a Sino-US condominium requires certain ideological convergence over democracy, human rights, and humanitarian intervention now lacking between United States and China. A duopoly must contend with Russia and India, both of which want to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy from the United States and China.
Community	"East Asia moving from a region of nations to a bona fide regional community where collective efforts are made for peace, prosperity and progress."	The deep levels of trust and a collective identity required for a genuine community is missing in Asia. A "pluralistic security community," in Asia in which war becomes "unthinkable" is implausible in the absence of genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation. There is no consensus on how to define an Asian community, or whom to include or exclude, resulting in competing proposals and blueprints.

Sources. Anarchy: Friedberg (1993–94), Friedberg (2000, and Friedberg 2011), Buzan and Segal (1994), and Emmott (2008). For counter-arguments, see Berger (2000) and Kang (2003).
Hegemony: Mearsheimer (2006), Holmes (2012), Walt (2012). For counter-arguments, see Acharya (2011).
Hierarchy: Kang (2008; Kang does not claim that the tributary system will reappear in Asia, but that Asia could see the emergence of a hierarchical regional order around a prosperous and powerful China). Qin (2007), Zhao (2005). On criticism of hierarchy, see Acharya (2003–2004; The *Tianxia* concept has been criticized for implying Chinese suzerainty over others), and Callahan (2008).
Concert/Condominium: White (2010). One scenario of a Sino-US duopoly, with China dominating the Asian heartland and United States the maritime Asia, see Ross (1999). For the limitations of the Concert model for Asia, see Acharya (1999) and Gordon (2012).
Community: East Asia Vision Group Report (2011; While "community" can be based on liberal theory, Asian leaders link the idea of Asian or East Asian community with culture and identity, rather than liberal values). For a skeptical view of the East Asian community idea, see Bisley (2010).

TABLE 2. Security Orders

	Great Power Management	*Shared Management**
High integration	Hegemony	Community**
Low integration	Concert/Condominium***	Consociation

(*Notes.* High integration implies economic, political, and security linkages that bring about a significant erosion of the autonomy/sovereignty of the weaker actors (either voluntary or coerced, as in a suzerain system.
Low integration implies economic and security linkages but no or little loss of autonomy/sovereignty.
*Shared between great powers and weaker actors.
**Refers here to "security community."
***Condominium refers to joint leadership of two great powers.)

within CSOs and contributes to the imperative of common survival and well-being. Liberal theory points to the impact of economic interdependence in raising the cost of war and inducing restraint among actors (Keohane and Nye 1977). Consociational theory stresses political and security interdependence, not just economic. Such interdependence can be existential, based on the simple facts of geographic proximity, natural cross-border trade, migration, and communications. Or it is contrived by the group as a way of fostering a long-term rationale for coexistence and cooperation. In most cases, it tends to be both. Interdependence does not, however, imply integration, especially political integration. Just as domestic

consociations respect the autonomy of constituents groups, international consociations must respect national independence and sovereignty.

Second, stability in a consociation comes from "equilibrium among the segments" (Bogaards 1998: 480). Unlike a security community, a consociational order does not transcend security competition (Bogaards 1998: 492). Instead, groups engage in coalitional politics to deny hegemony to any particular group. The key to consociational stability thus is the existence of "multiple balances of power."[6] This assumption echoes defensive realism. Unlike offensive realists who argue that states go for "all they can get" with hegemony as their ultimate goal (Mearsheimer 2001), defensive realists maintain that states are generally satisfied with the status quo if their own security is not challenged and thus concentrate on maintaining a balance of power (Glaser 1996; Tang 2010). Structural conditions such as anarchy do not invariably lead to expansionism; but the fear of triggering a security dilemma, calculations of the balance of power, and domestic politics induce states to abstain from pre-emptive war and engage in reassurance policies.

A third condition relates to institutions. A consociation is "a management coalition of sovereign states" (Chryssochoou 1994: 18). Consociational international institutions are more likely to be intergovernmental, rather than supranational (as in a community).[7] Theirs is a shared leadership system (also known as "joint consensual rule"), for example, no single power or a concert of great powers dominates them; instead, leadership is shared between weak and strong actors. For this reason, consociational institutions are normatively oriented to cooperative security, rather than collective security or collective defense.[8] Collective security and collective defense institutions are usually geared to deterring and punishing aggression ("security against" an adversary) and require hard power or military action. Hence, essential to their success is the material capabilities that mainly the great powers can provide. By contrast, cooperative security stresses restraint, reassurance ("security with" a competitor or adversary, rather than security against), and relies on confidence-building measures and political-diplomatic means to mitigate conflict. Hence, cooperative security institutions are more amenable to pluralistic or shared leadership involving strong and weak actors, and their impact is usually more normative than regulatory. For this reason, weaker states lacking in material capabilities may prefer cooperative security institutions to collective defense systems that institutionalize their unequal relationship with the great powers.

A fourth conducive condition for stability identified by consociational theory is "individual and collective elite restraint" (Dekmejian 1978: 255). This restraint is not because of idealism or altruism, but as Lijphart noted, because the elites (leaders) "understand of the perils of political fragmentation." Hence, they "accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures" (Lijphart 1962: 216). The distribution of power in a consociation may be asymmetrical, and hierarchy exists as an objective fact, but the more powerful actors respect the rights and interests of the weaker segments. Decisions are not made unilaterally nor are imposed by the powerful actors on the weak, but are made and implemented through consultations and consensus. A system of mutual or minority veto, or "negative minority rule" (Lijphart 1979: 501), prevails, meaning the less powerful actors do retain a say over collective decisions. This allows different units of the consociation to "function without the anxiety of having its vital interests 'subsumed'" by any other member or combined strength of the other members (Chryssochoou 1995: 19). This aspect also differentiates consociations from concerts, where the most powerful actors collectively monopolize the management of order and marginalize weaker states.

The four stability conditions are mutually reinforcing, and they are also in a mutually offsetting relationship with factors conducive to instability (Table 6).[9] Growing interdependence encourages cooperative institution-building and "elite" (great power) restraint by raising the costs of conflict. Equilibrium through balancing (defensive realism) supports institutions by rendering unilateral or hegemonic strategies less fruitful and likely. Institutions promote "elite" restraint which in turn fosters cooperative security norms and shared leadership in institutions. Interdependence and institutions encourage strategies to achieve equilibrium through "defensive balancing" and discourage offensive strategies (like expansionism or containment) that might aggravate the security dilemma. Similarly, balancing ("equilibrium") prevents hegemonic orders, whether that of a single power, duopolies, or concerts. A key point here is that none of the elements of a CSO is likely to be sufficient by itself to ensure stability; prospects for stability are greater if all four are present to some degree.

After outlining the conditions that sustain a CSO, let me outline the strengths and limitations of a CSO approach vis-à-vis other theoretical approaches to Asian security. Four are important. First, unlike existing theoretical approaches to Asian security, it offers a framework to consider mixed scenarios of conflict and peace, between the extremes of realist pessimism and liberal and constructivist optimism. The dependent variable of a CSO is stability in the sense of avoiding system breakdown, not competition or small scale wars—if the relevant conditions are present. It is not a Hobbesian anarchy or a Kantian or a Deutschian community. This is one of the real benefits, or "value-addeds," of the CSO framework.

Second, it represents an attempt to employ a theory (consociationalism) specifically concerned with stability at the domestic level to the international level. This has been rarely attempted by IR scholars. One important exception is the Democratic Peace theory. This theory holds that liberal democracies enjoy peaceful relations because they reproduce their domestic norms and practices of peaceful competition and tolerance at the international level, especially when dealing with fellow democracies. But the democratic peace outcome requires a shared liberal normative and institutional setting among all the participating actors, which is hardly

[6] "[A] multiple balance of power among the segments in a plural society is more conducive to consociational democracy than a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of the segments" Lijphart (1977: 55). Also see Andeweg (2000).

[7] A consociational view of the European Union sees it as "a decentralized system in which the participating actors…have a high level interdependence with each other, but nevertheless, preserve and even augment their autonomy" (Chryssochoou 1995: 18).

[8] For distinctions between collective security, collective defence, and cooperative security roles in regional institutions, see Kupchan (1997).

[9] I borrow the idea of mutually reinforcing and mutually offsetting factors from Friedberg (2005).

commonplace in world politics. Democratic Peace theory is not specifically relevant to the management of cultural diversity, where cultural and political norms may differ significantly among actors.

A third advantage of the CSO concept is that it departs from a parsimonious single theoretical lens and draws from multiple theoretical lenses: realism's balance of power, liberalism's economic interdependence, and constructivism's socialization and cooperative security institutions (which overlaps with liberal institutionalism, but focuses more on social influence as opposed to strategic bargaining in the former). As noted from the previous discussion (Table 1), scenarios derived from single theoretical lenses have proven to be inadequate at capturing the complexity of Asian security. They identify single or convergent causal mechanisms of stability/instability, while the CSO framework, as noted, holds that no single factor is by itself sufficient to ensure stability; all four must be present to some degree. Hence, the CSO framework is consistent with "analytic eclecticism," a relatively new approach to international relations, which is especially relevant to the study of "mixed scenarios" of conflict and stability.[10]

Finally, the CSO concept helps to place the discussion of the rise of China in a broader regional context. The recent discussions of Asian security "treat China as if it is the only country in the region and focus more on the US-China relationship than on East Asia itself…but the region comprises much more than China, and it is these interactions that are going to have the most impact on stability."[11] The CSO framework is especially suitable for capturing the broader regional context, as CSOs imply a political canvass of multiple interests and identities and interactions among them.

Now I turn to the potential pitfalls and limitations of the CSO approach. Two are especially noteworthy. The first has to do with migrating a theoretical approach about ethnic competition and cooperation in the domestic politics to the international realm. In international relations, one does not have "multiple ethnic groups fighting for the control over a single state."[12] This may be why the consociational theory has been rarely used by international relations scholars. But there are examples of security competition ("fighting") that feeds upon the multiple and competing ethnic and nationalist identities of states within a given region for the control of regional order. Asia as a multi-ethnic region provides one of the clearest examples, although one can find them in Africa. Moreover, as Martin and Simmons argue, concepts and approaches in domestic politics do yield valuable insights into international institutionalization and cooperation (Martin and Simmons 1998). Hence, the application of a domestic theory to Asian regional order is an important value-added to existing approaches to Asian security, especially when applied in conjunction with some international relations theories, which in this essay includes defensive realism, the liberal notion of interdependence, and the constructivist element of norms and socializing institutions.

A second potential liability of the CSO construct could be that it might introduce a "stability bias," predisposing one toward positive outcomes in security interactions. This risk is especially there because of the key theoretical foundations of the CSO approach: Defensive realism, interdependence, and social constructivism as applied to institutions all specify conditions for fostering stability. While acknowledging the risk that the CSO framework might predispose an analysis of security order toward optimistic predictions, I stress that my purpose here is not to predict the future, or assert that a CSO in Asia will emerge, but to use the CSO framework to identify the conditions which will determine the likelihood of its emergence. It is to look beyond available perspectives on Asian security with a framework that employs a more comprehensive range of drivers of regional order than the changing distribution of power, which is what most people mean by the "rise of China." To the extent that one finds these conditions to be present in Asian economic, political, and strategic trends, one might then expect greater stability. In the same vein, their relative absence or decline might lead one to expect conflict. With these, I now turn to a brief examination of these trends.

Asian Regional Shifts

In the early postwar period, prospects for Asia's security order were shaped by three dominant features: economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism. Economic nationalism in Asia, spurred by a desire to enhance economic sovereignty to match political independence and aimed at reducing vulnerability to foreign economic forces, was clearly articulated at the historic Asian-African conference at Bandung in 1955. Subsequently, it produced a reliance on import-substitution strategies throughout Southeast Asia till the 1970s, when export-led growth models began to appear in that region. As James Kurth noted, "In regard to the international economy, the East Asian states are not international liberals but rather international mercantilists (1989). Security bilateralism emerged through America's bilateral military alliances in the region, termed as the "hub-and-spoke" system. This has been widely credited with providing not only the security of the alliance partners, but maintaining regional stability in Asia. Authoritarianism was Asia's dominant postwar political trend. Democratic leaders and political systems that emerged from the end of the colonial period found it difficult to get going. Communist takeovers in China, North Korea, and the Indochinese countries aside, democratic backsliding or the emergence of outright dictatorships occurred in practically every Asian country with the exception of Japan and India.

Half a century later, economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism have given way to a complex mix of economic interdependence, security multipolarity (after a unipolar moment) multilateralism, and political pluralism (Figure 1), with profound consequences for regional order. Below, I discuss each of these developments, highlighting not only the progress made

[10] The usefulness of analytic eclecticism lies in producing middle-range theoretical arguments as well as addressing "problems of wide scope that, in contrast to more narrowly parsed research puzzles designed to test theories or fill in gaps within research traditions, incorporate more of the complexity and messiness of particular real-world situations" (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Empirical studies based on analytic eclecticism are as yet few; my paper is a contribution in this respect. But while analytical eclecticism calls for selectively applying different theories to explain different parts of a problematic or puzzle, my approach may be better described as "analytical holism," which employs a synthetic construct drawn from the major theories to a particular issue or case.

[11] I owe these lines to the helpful comments of an anonymous reviewer.

[12] I am grateful to another anonymous reviewer for this language and suggesting this point.



Fig 1. Asian Paradigm Shift? *Note.* O: Security Order



Fig 2. Intraregional Trade in Asia. *Source.* Asian Development Bank

toward interdependence, multilateralism, and democratization, but also the limits of these trends.

Economic Interdependence

Trade among the market-oriented economies of Asia and the Pacific nearly doubled as a proportion of their total trade between 1955 and 2005 (See Figure 2). Intra-East Asian trade today is higher than that in the NAFTA region (46%), and "very much comparable to intraregional trade in the European Union before the 1992 Maastricht treaty" (Kuroda 2005). China's trade with the United States in goods in 2009 was $366 billion, compared to $116 billion in 2000 (US Census Bureau). Foreign direct investment from the United States in China was over $45.7 billion in 2008 (Office of the US Trade Representative). In 2009, China's trade with Japan was $228.9 billion (The US-China Business Council), compared to $102 billion in 2002 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic Of China's 2004), and with India $43.4 billion (The US-China Business Council), compared to $2.5 billion in 2000 (Brooks and Ferrarini 2010: 6). Mainland China–Taiwan trade in goods jumped from $25.83 billion in 1999 (Mastel 2001) to $106.2 billion in 2009 (The US-China Business Council). The level of two-way trade between China and ASEAN increased from US$8 billion in 1991 to over US$40 billion in 2001 and $231 billion in 2008 (People's Daily Online 2009). In 2008, China's trade with East Asia reached $757.5 billion (Asian Regional Integration Center).

Economic links in Asia have "moved beyond deepening intra-regional trade" and "become more *functionally integrative*" (Dent 2008: 46). Transnational production networks in East Asia cover both inter-industry and intra-industry or intra-firm trade (Bowles 1997: 223). Since the 1990s, China has joined Japan as another focal point of Asian regionalization, becoming a "regional integrator" (Lardy 2002). While Japanese FDI in the 1980s and 1990s encouraged a vertical or hierarchical structure in regionalized production (the so-called "flying geese"), with Japan producing the most advanced components, South Korea and Taiwan supplying intermediate components, and the ASEAN countries (except Singapore) producing lower-end parts and functioning as assembly sites, the production network emerging around China is more horizontal. Contrary to concerns that Southeast Asia may be reduced to a "semicolonial" status *vis-a-vis* China (which might support the scenario of a developing Chinese regional hegemony), China–ASEAN trade features export of manufactured products to each other. For example, the share of machinery and electrical appliances in China-ASEAN trade jumped from 12.41% in 1993 to 47.1% in ASEAN's total exports to China and from 20.78% in 1993 to 57.9% in ASEAN's imports from

China. This, demonstrating the importance of intra-industry trade, suggests the emergence of more horizontal, rather than hierarchical, production networks and supply chains between China and ASEAN (Men 2007: 266).

Financial interdependence and cooperation among Asian countries is growing as well. Chastened by the regional contagion effect of the financial crises of 1997 and 2008, Asian countries have set up currency swap arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative (now both bilateral and multilateral components, the former stood at US $90 billion in April 2009 [Ministry of Finance Japan] while the latter announced in 2010 amounts to $120 billion [People's Daily Online's 2010]). Moreover, the structure of economic interdependence is not intra-Asian, but also transpacific. Four Asian countries rank among the top ten nations holding US treasury securities (as of May 2009), with China topping the list at US $801.5 billion; Japan (2nd) at $677.2; Hong Kong (7th) at $93.2; Taiwan (9th) at $75.7 billion (US Department of the Treasury).

Further growth of economic interdependence in Asia is constrained by concerns about unequal benefits of regional trade agreements, fear of Chinese dominance, the rise of bilateral trade arrangements, and the launching of a separate trade liberalization track by the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), that excludes China. Moreover, one of the more ambitious trade arrangements, the ASEAN Economic Community, is moving slower than envisaged. These trends might constrain the pacific effects of interdependence, which will be discussed in the following section.



Fig 3. Alliances and Institutions 1955



Fig 4. Alliances and Institutions 2005

Institutions

Regional institutions in Asia, stimulated by growing interdependence, today outnumber bilateral or multilateral alliances, reversing the situation that existed in the 1950s (Table 2, Figures 3 and 4). The functions of multipurpose institutions have expanded to cover both interstate and transnational security issues. ASEAN, originally intended to reduce interstate tensions and promote economic cooperation, now tackles a wider variety of issues, admitted with a mixed record, environment, illegal migration, natural disasters, pandemics, terrorism. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has looked beyond confidence-building to a role in addressing transnational challenges such as disaster relief and terrorism. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) summit serves an important political purpose. New and more specialized institutions have emerged to cover specific issue areas, the most notable being the Chiang Mai Initiative to address financial issues not handled by other regional bodies. The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) created in 1997, has also become the de facto regional framework for coordinating regional responses to pandemics and other nontraditional security threats. ASEAN is adopting greater institutionalization and legalization, especially with the adoption of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and the ASEAN Charter. The newest institution, the East Asian Summit, engages all the major powers in Asia, including the United States.

On the negative side, ASEAN and other multilateral bodies in Asia have a mixed record in carrying out their security functions, due to disagreements over regional definition, intra-mural territorial disputes and mistrust over historical memories, continued adherence of states to the principle of non-intervention, and an aversion to too much legalization. Moreover, there is a competitive aspect to regional institution-building, with China preferring an exclusively East Asian framework minus the United States, while Japan and others supporting an Asia-Pacific framework that includes the United States.

Multilateralism in Asia reshapes the purpose and function of the US bilateral alliance system, rendering US alliances in the region less exclusive, by encouraging them to develop a wider range of activities involving a greater number of actors, a well-known example being the expansion of the bilateral US-Thailand Cobra Gold exercise into a multilateral one, with China as an observer. Such trends also reflect what Admiral Dennis Blair (the former chief of the US Pacific Command and former Director of National Intelligence) termed as the "security community" approach, turning the "hub-and-spoke" of US bilateral alliances in Asia and the Pacific to a web of cross-cutting interactions and relationship that could form the basis for a Pacific community (Blair and Hanley Jr. 2000).

Democratization

Since 1986, democratic transitions have occurred in South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia (Table 3). Data from Freedom House also

Table 3. Alliances and Institutions in Asia: 1955 and 2005

Bilateral Alliances 1955	*Bilateral Alliances 2005*	*Multilateral Alliances 1955*	*Multilateral Alliances 2005*	*Multilateral Institutions 1955*	*Multilateral Institutions 2005*
United States-Philippines Mutual Security Act (1951)	United States-Philippines Mutual Security Act (1951)	Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) (1951)	Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) (1951)*	Asian Relations Organization (1947), defunct in 1955	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967)
United States-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty (1953)	United States-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty (1953)	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954), defunct by 1977	Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), (1971)		South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (1985)
United States-Thailand Manila Pact (1954)	United States-Thailand Manila Pact (1954)				Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1989)
United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty (1954)**	United States-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954)				ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (1994)
United States-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1954)					ASEAN + 3 (APT) (1997)
					Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (2001)
					Six-Party Talks*** (2003)
					East Asia Summit (EAS) (2005)

(Notes. *1986 marks the beginning of the suspension of Treaty obligations toward New Zealand, yet this alliance remains in force between the United States and Australia.
**Terminated in 1980, after the United States recognized the People's Republic of China in 1979.
***Not a formal organization, although such a grouping is officially envisaged for the future.)

show that between 1988 and 1989, the number of electoral democracies in Asia doubled from 5 to 10 (Figure 5). From 1972 to 2010, the number of "free" countries increased from 5 to 6, while the number of "partly free" countries increased from 8 to 11 and the number of "not free" countries decreased from 11 to 7. The combined total of "free" and "partly free" countries in Asia now outnumber the total number of "not free" countries by 17 to 7, compared to 13-11 in 1972 (Figure 6).

Democratization remains uneven in Asia, not just with China's remaining under authoritarian rule, but also recent reversals happening in Thailand (albeit briefly) and backsliding in Cambodia. Moreover, it might be argued that Asia's new democracies are really semi-authoritarian, rather than liberal-democratic. On the positive side, East Asia refutes the view that democratization increases the danger of war. No two democratizing states in East Asia have fought a war against each other. While democratization has been accompanied by domestic violence, as in Indonesia following the downfall of Suharto, descent into authoritarian rule (the onset of the Suharto regime) produced even greater violence in Indonesia. Moreover, newly democratic nations in Asia have shown a tendency to pursue cooperative security strategies (marked by restraint and cooperation) toward their neighbors (Table 4). Examples include Thailand's efforts in the late 1980s at turning Indo-China's "battlefields to market places," South Korea's policy under Kim Dae Jung in the later 1990s ("Sunshine policy") and Indonesia's efforts in the early 2000s to create an "ASEAN political-Security Community."

What are the implications of these trends? It is not that democracy is a prerequisite for a CSO.[13] But democratization thwarts the alternative prospect of a regional hegemony under autocratic China by undercutting its normative and ideological legitimacy. An ideological Monroe Doctrine by China will be opposed as long as the trends toward greater political openness continue and Asia's largest economics and political players—India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea—remain democratic.

After outlining the trends favorable to a CSO and their limits, I now examine the implications of these trends for Asia's security order, especially how they might affect the conditions for a CSO in Asia. I will highlight

[13] Some domestic consociations achieve stability under authoritarian rule, for example, Malaysia in the 1980s and 1990s. Hence, one might argue, why can't an Asian order, hegemonic, undemocratic but stable, develop under China? The problem with this view is that consociations can also be democratic and stable (India) and authoritarianism does not necessarily lead states to join China's orbit. Malaysia, which had not abandoned democracy completely and is opening up again, did not bandwagon with China even when it sank to greater authoritarianism, nor did semi-authoritarian Singapore (which is also opening up now), which had once embraced the idea of "Asian values" also espoused by China. And Burma's military junta is embracing political reform partly to reduce dependence on China. Also, there is a greater likelihood of resistance to a hegemonic/autocratic order at the international level in Asia because of US presence and alliances than in a domestic sphere where sovereignty and non-interference principles apply more.



Fig 5. Asia's Electoral Democracies 1988–2010



Fig 6. Asia's Freedom Index, 1972–2010. *Source.* Freedom House. The Term "Electoral Democracy" Differs From "Liberal Democracy" in That, Aside From Competitive Multiparty Elections and Universal Adult Suffrage, the Latter Also Implies the Presence of a Substantial Array of Civil Liberties

Table 4. Democratic Transitions in East Asia: Key Dates

Philippines: February 1986: Corazon Aquino replaces Fidel Marcos.

South Korea: June 1987: Direct presidential elections under Roh Tae Woo, June 29, 1987.

Taiwan: July 1987: Chiang Ching-Kuo, on October 30, 1986, announced that KMT state would lift the martial law in July 1987. First elections in which parties other than Kuomintang were allowed to compete were held in 1989.

Thailand: July 1988 (Chatichai Choonhavan became the first elected prime minister replacing Prem Tinsulanonda. He led the country and the coalition government until the military coup in 1991); May 1992 (Anand Panyarachun replaces Sunthorn/Suchinda) and September 1992, when Chuan Leekpai come to office in election.

Cambodia: 1993: Ranarridh–Hun Sen coalition government replaced the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) after elections.

Indonesia: June 7, 1999 (first parliamentary elections after collapse of Suharto regime in May 1998 organized under Habibie); October 20, 1999 (first presidential elections—indirect). Habibie had resigned after losing accountability vote on October 19, 1999.

trends that favor and those which inhibit those conditions.

Implications for Consociational Security in Asia

Interdependence

Opinion is divided on the pacific impact of economic interdependence. Skeptics argue that growing economic ties has a poor record in preventing conflict in the past (the two world wars) and that it can create new forms of competition and conflict now, such as competition over resources and markets. Believers in economic interdependence see it otherwise. To quote President Obama, "economic ties and commercial ties that are taking place in this region are helping to lower a lot of the tensions that date back before you were born or even before I was born… there's something about when people think that they can do business and make money that makes them think very clearly and not worry as much about ideology. And I think that that's starting to happen in this region" (The White House 2009). The historical analogy may not be entirely accurate, given the broader and deeper structure of economic interdependence that obtains in Asia



Fig 7. Military Expenditures in Asia (in constant 2010 US$ m). *Source*. SIPRI; ASEAN: Combination of Military expenditure of all ASEAN countries for which data were available

today compared to nineteenth-century Europe. Capital flows today are more in the form of *foreign direct investment* (FDI), which create an international division of labor whose "impact on security relations will indeed be transformative" (Pollins 2008: 3, 9).[14] As regards new forms of conflict, while competition for resources does exist in Asia, for example, the Sino-Indian competition for energy resources, it is a far cry from the "orgy of imperialism" that swept Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, creating an "international tension which made everyone conscious of war" (Stone 1983: 96–107).

Equilibrium

China poses the most powerful challenge to Asia's balance of power. But despite its growing economy (likely to be the number 1 in the world in the next decade) and military spending (Figure 7), the United States remains and is likely to remain for a long time, the preeminent military player in Asia.[15] While China's naval build-up gives it an increasing capacity for denying areas close to its shore to the United States and its allies, any effort by it to dominate the sea lanes of Asia and the Indian Ocean can be countered by the naval forces of the United States, in cooperation with Japan and India. The balancing between China and the United States is consistent with defensive realism, rather than offensive realism (which would imply aggressive expansionism and power maximization by China and preemptive containment by the United States). The United States' strategic concepts of "hedging" and "pivot" (renamed as "rebalancing") support this. In 2006, the United States outlined a policy of "encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region" while creating "prudent hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail to preclude future conflict" (Stewart 2009). This strategy involved deploying six carrier battle groups in the Pacific and 60% of its attack submarine fleet (the *Washington Times* 2006). Under "rebalancing," the US navy would shift by 2020 from a 50/50% split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to a 60/40% split, including six aircraft carriers. The aim of rebalancing is to "maintain a nuanced balance" against China while averting "the potential for a…slippery slope toward growing confrontation with China" (The Brookings Institution 2012: 9). While the new US strategy faces budgetary challenges, it also has significant bipartisan support.

Shared leadership

Asia's regional institutions provide the main avenue for shared, rather than hegemonic, leadership. They lack collective security/defense functions, which would require hegemonic leadership—single or collective (concert). Instead, they promote cooperative security. This has allowed ASEAN to stay in the driver's seat of Asian institutions and helped the engagement of China, Vietnam, and India into the region (Table 5).[16] In the 1990s, they helped to overcome Beijing's initial suspicion of multilateralism as well as America's initial leaning toward a containment strategy (Shambaugh 2004–2005). Arguably, Asia's regional institutions did a better job of dealing with China than Europe's in dealing with Russia. NATO's expansion excluding Russia undermined Europe's cooperative security doctrine promoted by the OSCE. Asia's institutions followed the norm of "security with" in spirit, if not in its legalistic form, by offering full membership to China. ASEAN's strategy continues to engage all the great powers so that no single power can dominate them. This was what led it to invite Australia,

[14] One study shows that China's compliance with global norms has increased in keeping with its increasing interdependence with the rest of the world. See Foot and Walter (2011).

[15] Here, there is an interesting parallel with some domestic consociations in Southeast Asia, where the key minority groups (ethnic Chinese) retain substantial economic power. A similar complexity might underpin an Asian CSO if, as likely, China overtakes the United States economically while the United States retains the military advantage. But this would mean neither side would risk war with the other.

[16] This is supported by Johnston's (2007) finding that multilateral institutions have made China's decision makers (including technocrats) more attuned to international and regional cooperative norms.

Table 5. Regional Institutions and the Socialization of Vietnam, China, and India

	ASEAN	*APEC*	*ARF*
Vietnam	Observer status in ASEAN in 1992; Full ASEAN membership in 1995; Chair (rotational) of ASEAN in 2001 and 2010. Leading role in drafting the Hanoi Plan of Action for ASEAN. Abandoned its hegemonic Indochinese federation concept.	Joined APEC in 1998. Hosted APEC Summit in 2006. Growing domestic economic liberalization.	Founding member in 1994; Chair of ARF 2001 and 2010 Cooperative security: regular participation in the ARF's CBMs and capacity-building initiatives.
China	Full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1996; Signatory to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003; Willing to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN in 2010. Agreed to multilateral talks with ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute.	Joined in 1991 along with Taiwan and Hong Kong. Supports development-oriented agenda for APEC.	Founding member in 1994. Regular participation in CBMs and capacity-building initiatives; initiated ARF's Security Policy Conference (ASPC -meeting of defense ministry senior officials) in 2004. Excludes Taiwan Issue; Opposes full preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution role for ARF; Opposes raising South China Sea dispute in ARF.
India	Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1992; Signatory to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003; Full dialogue partner in 2005; Willing to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as a nuclear weapon state; India–ASEAN Free Trade agreed in 2008.	Not an APEC member but desire for membership influenced by growing if qualified economic openness.	Joined the ARF in 1996; Cooperative security through participation in confidence-building measures, especially maritime security and counter-terrorism initiatives.

Table 6. Mutually Reinforcing and Offsetting Factors in an Asian CSO

Mutually Reinforcing Factors (≫)	*Mutually Offsetting Factors (><)*
Regional institutions (cooperative security) ≫; China's status quo orientation (defensive realism)	Institutions >< pre-emptive containment of China ("ripe for rivalry")
Interdependence ≫ regional institutions	Interdependence >< Chinese hegemony (offensive realism); great power conflict ("ripe for rivalry")
Democratization ≫ cooperative security (South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand)	Democratization >< Chinese hegemony (Monroe Doctrine, offensive realism)
Equilibrium ≫ institutions	Equilibrium >< Chinese or American Hegemony

India, Russia, and the United States into the EAS, despite the latter being East Asian in geographic scope.

Some wonder if ASEAN might lose its unity and ability to lead, not the least due to a Chinese assertiveness and "divide and rule" strategy. If this happens, and if ASEAN and related institutions are marginalized or replaced by an Asian concert of powers or a Sino-US G-2, or an Asian NATO, the prospects for an Asian CSO would be seriously damaged. So far, these ideas have found little support in the region. ASEAN has value to China's effort to legitimize its "peaceful rise" concept. And ASEAN's continued leadership survives by default because no great power—the United States, China, Japan, or India—is in a position to develop a multilateral security institution under its own imprint either due to historical baggage or the level of mistrust among them.

Elite Restraint

As discussed, all the great powers recognize the "centrality" of ASEAN in the regional security architecture, a sign of restraint or even respect toward a coalition of weaker actors. But there is uncertainty over Chinese restraint. After a period of "charm offensive" in the 1990s and early 2000s and growing engagement with ASEAN-led regional bodies to demonstrate its "peaceful rise," China has become more assertive especially in the South China Sea dispute. China's role in the East China Sea island dispute (over Senkaku/Diaoyu) with Japan has also raised concern regarding Chinese intentions.

Yet, in the South China Sea issue, which presents a critical test of Chinese restraint because of China's huge military superiority over the ASEAN claimants, China has not invaded any island by force since 1974, only occupied

TABLE 7. Asian Security Orders

	*Continued American Primacy**	*Hegemony/Hierarchy (Sino-centric)***	*Concert/Condominium****	*Community*	*Consociation*
Leadership	United States	China	Major powers (United States, China, Japan, India and Russia) Only United States and China in the case of condominium	ASEAN-centered regional security community	Shared between the major powers and ASEAN
Geographic Scope	Maritime Asia	Southeast Asia and parts of South and Central Asia	Exclude ASEAN from leadership	Asia-Pacific Community (includes the United States); East Asian Community (excludes the United States); Asian community (includes India, but excludes the United States)	Inclusive of all powers and sub-regions
Key driver	US military dominance and containment of China	Chinese sphere of influence (benign or coercive)	Great power collective hegemony	Interdependence: Shared norms, communitarian or collective identity	Interdependence: Shared norms, separate but cross-cutting national identities
Structure of power	Unipolar (United States as number 1)	Unipolar (China as number 1)	Multipolar	"Nonpolar"; "polycentric"	Asymmetric multipolarity or loose China-US bipolarity
Economic linkages	Japan-centered regionalization persists/ revives; joined by India; Washington consensus (modified); a plurality of bilateral FTAs with the USA, TPP	Dependencia and regional economic bloc around China; a plurality of bilateral FTAs with China; Beijing consensus	Bilateral FTAs around major powers compete with each other, World Trade Organization (WTO) weakens	Deepening regional trade, production and financial integration and emergence of a Asia-Pacific FTA involving India	WTO retains salience; High trade interdependence and moderate production and financial integration around China, United States, India, and Japan
Key Institutional Structures	US bilateral alliances (old and new) renewed and revitalized; Asian NATO	China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA); Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); ASEAN-Plus-Three	Minilateralism; Ad hoc multilateralism (Six-Party Talks)	ASEAN, ARF, EAS; regional civil society ("people's ASEAN")	ASEAN; ASEAN, APEC; ARF, EAS; SCO, SAARC; institutionalization of Six-Party Talks
Norms and Identity	Liberal democracy and human rights (with occasional double standards); no Asian identity	Non-intervention; Asian values; hierarchy; neo-Confucian identity; China socializes ASEAN	No major changes in territorial status quo without consent of major powers; national identities remain salient, no regional identity emerges	From non-intervention to "flexible engagement"; emergence of collective regional identity or "we-feeling"; ASEAN socializes China	No natural sense of collective identity or "we-feeling", but a "corporate identity" based on functional interdependence and interactions

(Continued)

TABLE 7. (Continued)

	*Continued American Primacy**	*Hegemony/Hierarchy (Sino-centric)***	*Concert/Condominium****	*Community*	*Consociation*
Domestic Politics	Increasing democratization creating conditions for a political "alliance of democracies"	Shared and persistent authoritarianism	Mixed and divergent political systems leading to Ideological polarization (concert collapse)	Transition to liberal democracy	Increasing democratization, but authoritarianism remains
Outlook for Stability	Stable depending on the extent of America's relative decline; US military presence is the primary means of region's stability; war between China and United States remains possible	Region remains stable depending on China's internal condition; recurring Chinese military or political intervention in neighboring countries; war between China and other powers remains possible	Stability depends on Great power willingness to coordinate and compromise; major power war (China-India; China-United States; China-Japan) remains possible	War becomes unthinkable	Crisis points and low-level conflicts occur, but system-destroying war is avoided

(*Notes.* *I have included US primacy as one of the possible orders.
**I have merged Chinese hegemony and hierarchy into one category, as based on previous discussion, the line separating coercive and benign Chinese management can be rather thin.
***Similarly, concert and condominium have similar attributes except for the number of great powers. Anarchy is dropped here because it is not a form of order.)

islands that were previously unoccupied.[17] China also relented in its initial refusal to discuss this dispute multilaterally with ASEAN (which includes non-claimant states) or at the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes non-regional states including the United States. It has not closed the door to negotiations. After renewed tensions with Philippines and ASEAN in 2012, Beijing "backed off" from its hardline stance and diplomatically reassured Vietnam, Philippines, and ASEAN.[18] In Northeast Asia, China has worked to restrain North Korea's nuclear ambitions and moved some distance away from the use of force in dealing with Taiwan.

Moreover, Chinese restraint stems not from altruism, but from strategic calculations and normative pressure that the conditions of a CSO—balance of power, interdependence, institutions—provide.[19] Strategically, Chinese leaders realize that assertiveness would push the ASEAN countries closer to the United States (a balancing factor). China's engagement with ASEAN since the mid-1990s has been a source of normative and diplomatic pressure; China has engaged regional institutions to sell its peaceful rise policy and deny other powers, such as Japan and the United States, the opportunity to take over the show. Another source of Chinese restraint lies more in its dependence on Middle Eastern and African oil imports via the Indian Ocean, whose sea lanes are controlled by the US and Indian navies. Hence, while uncertainty over Chinese restraint is a significant challenge to an Asian CSO, Chinese calculations in the context of the US "rebalancing" strategy and the political and normative costs of a war with ASEAN members make it more, rather than less likely.

Conclusion

The CSO framework offers a novel and dynamic approach to conflict and stability in Asia. Going beyond existing perspectives that rely on single theoretical

[17] Many Chinese analysts take this to be a major indicator of Chinese restraint (personal communication with Chinese Scholar, August 23, 2012). In the dispute with Japan (which is also true of the South China Sea case), China has "shown some restraint" by not deploying its heavily armed naval ships, but maritime patrol crafts (the *Washington Post* 2012: A6). Also, China does not bear all the blame for the escalation of these disputes. As a seasoned US expert on China points out, "A strong case can be made that the starting gun in the new dash for petroleum and natural gas in the South China Sea was fired not by China, but by Vietnam, which authorized drilling in disputed blocks in 2006 (Paal 2012).

[18] Interview with Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, September 26, 2012. Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo met with the Vietnamese foreign minister in Beijing in February 2012 to diffuse tensions, while foreign minister Yang Jiechi declared China's willingness to work with ASEAN to implement the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. This is in keeping with past behavior, after pursuing a heavy-handed stance toward ASEAN on the dispute in 2010, Beijing in January 2011 "signaled…return to a more restrained regional policy" (Gompert and Saunders 2011: 45).

[19] A recent review of discussions and statements by Chinese scholars and policymakers on Asian security shows that "While the Chinese are to some extent skeptical of the US staying power in the region, against the backdrop of the new US 'rebalancing' to Asia-Pacific, a close reading of Chinese discourse show that more Chinese analysts believe that China should still restrain from directly challenging United States in the region. In fact, Chinese official statements have only shown restraints so far, despite being pressured from hypernationalistic noises at home" (Memo on "Chinese Strategic Discourse and Debate," prepared by a Chinese analyst for the author. September 15, 2012). Gompert and Saunders (2011: 45) argue that the Chinese military's growing reliance on space and cyberspace capabilities creates vulnerabilities against US capabilities in these areas that may induce both sides to seek greater strategic restraint in potential conflict situations.



Fig 8. Asia's Security Orders. *Notes.* *In Anarchy, Great Powers Pursue Unilateral Security Policies. **Shared Implies Shared Among all Actors, not Just Among the Great Powers

lenses, and combining elements of defensive realism, liberalism, constructivism, and consociational theory, it captures a wider range of determinants of Asia's security. It emphasizes the regional context of the implications of China's rise instead of focusing on great power (especially US-China) relationships, as has been the case with many existing perspectives on the issue. It represents a mixed scenario of conflict and stability, presenting an alternative between the extremes of anarchy that represent Europe's past as Asia's future on the one hand and a security community that renders war unthinkable on the other (Europe's present as Asia's future). While not necessarily predictive, it offers an analytic device for evaluating trends and directions in Asian security by identifying the conditions—interdependence, equilibrium, institutions, and elite restraint—that can produce order (understood as the absence of system-destroying war, rather than small-scale conflicts), and their absence, disorder.

A key theoretical implication of this essay concerns the relationship between rising powers and regional orders. Unlike much existing scholarship that looks at Asian security primarily through the lens of China and Sino-US relations, I look at it through the prism of regional conditions, how the latter might shape China and Sino-US relations, instead of being shaped by them. In so doing, I also turn on its head Mearsheimer's (2001) structural realist thesis about rising powers and regional orders. For Mearsheimer, rising powers tend to seek regional hegemony and China is headed in this direction. I point to the opposite possibility: how regions constrain rising power hegemony, especially if they have the conditions of a CSO identified above. Hence, while Mearsheimer argues that emerging hegemons tend to coerce regions, I argue that regions constrain emerging hegemons.

On balance, conditions favorable to a CSO are in greater evidence in Asia in recent decades than in the past. The early post-Second World War drivers of Asian security, economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and political authoritarianism are now challenged if not displaced by economic interdependence, security multilateralism, and democratic change. This has created mutually reinforcing conditions that also offset some of the key factors for conflict (Table 6). This perhaps explains why post-Cold War Asia has thus far defied the initially dire predictions about descending into catastrophic conflict.

But the CSO is not a static construct. If the above trends persist, Asia will have greater prospects for a CSO-based stability relative to other security orders (Table 7, Figure 8). But these enabling conditions also have limits; their continuation cannot be taken for granted. Reversal would be indicated in a sharp decline in economic interdependence, the failure of the US rebalancing strategy due to political and budgetary constraints, China's abandonment of restraint toward its neighbors, the collapse of ASEAN. This would render unlikely an Asian CSO conducive to regional stability.

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