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# Manufacturing Dissent: Modernization and the Onset of Major Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns

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## Abstract

A growing research field examines the conditions under which major nonviolent resistance campaigns—that is, popular nonviolent uprisings for regime or territorial change—are successful. Why these campaigns emerge in the first place is less well understood. We argue that extensive social networks that are economically interdependent with the state make strategic nonviolence more feasible. These networks are larger and more powerful in states whose economies rely upon organized labor. Global quantitative analysis of the onset of violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1960 to 2006 (NAVCO), and major protest events in Africa from 1990 to 2009 (SCAD) shows that the likelihood of nonviolent conflict onset increases with the proportion of manufacturing to gross domestic product. This study points to a link between modernization and social conflict, a link that has been often hypothesized, but, hitherto, unsupported by empirical studies.

## Keywords

internal armed conflict, conflict, rebellion, resource extraction, social networks

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The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia on December 17, 2010, sparked a series of protests that overthrew the Tunisian regime. Chief among the organizers of this campaign were independent trade unionists and the Tunisian Federation of Labor Unions. Labor organizations were also crucial to the onset of protest campaigns in Egypt (Goldstone 2011). Are these systematic features of revolutionary action? Do the institutions that coalesce around organized labor make mass dissent more likely? In this article, we argue, and present quantitative evidence to the effect, that these institutions do indeed facilitate dissent, but of the *nonviolent* kind.

Research on nonviolent resistance campaigns has grown in the last years (Zunes 1994; Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Schock 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Shaykhutdinov 2010; Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson, 2014). Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) seminal work shows that nonviolent insurrections are more likely to effect regime transitions and result in stable, peaceful democracies than violent insurrections. Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) and Celestino and Gleiditsch (2013) make similar findings. However, we know relatively little about why nonviolent campaigns are initiated. There is a rich case study literature on the emergence of nonviolent campaigns (Nepstad 2011; Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Stephan 2006, 2009), but the only published quantitative studies, examined globally and inclusively, of which we are aware are Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013).<sup>1</sup> By and large, Chenoweth and Stephan's study is designed to defend their main argument from criticisms of endogeneity. Chenoweth and Lewis conduct a preliminary test of the onset of nonviolent uprisings compared to civil wars. We build upon their argument that the causal processes driving the onset of violent and nonviolent campaigns are different but forward the debate by considering the specific mobilization demands of strategic nonviolence and generating hypotheses thereupon. There is also an important literature examining the determinants of social protest (Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Smith 2004; Walton and Ragin 1990; Kurtz 2004; Arce and Bellinger 2007), but these studies tend to focus on protest severity rather than onset and include small and "spontaneous" protests and riots that do not necessarily espouse "maximalist" goals of regime change or secession that we are primarily interested in here. Nonetheless, we build upon the insights from these studies. In addition, while quantitative studies have examined the link between economic structure and civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lujala 2009; Thies 2010), we here present the first quantitative study of economic structure and nonviolent conflict on a global sample.

We argue that violent and nonviolent tactics have different resource mobilization demands and draw upon different social networks for this purpose. Nonviolence is most efficacious when dissidents can induce mass mobilization and impose costs upon the regime without resorting to direct violence. Extensive social networks that "bridge" social groups and are economically integrated with the state are useful for these ends. We argue that these social networks are most likely to be present in states with high levels of manufacturing to gross domestic product (GDP), and, therefore, that nonviolent campaigns should emerge more frequently in these contexts. In

contrast, organized violence tends to emerge from economically isolated “intensive” social networks with few “bridges” to other social groups.

Empirical analysis provides robust support for this argument. Multinomial logit models of the onset of violent and nonviolent movements globally, as defined by the nonviolent and violent campaigns and outcomes (NAVCO) data 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) and within Africa as defined by the social conflict in Africa dataset (SCAD; Hendrix and Salehyan 2013), show that the probability of nonviolent campaign onset increases as the proportion of manufacturing to GDP increases and this effect is comparatively strong. Other plausible correlates such as state-led discrimination, infant mortality, and other measures of modernization such as education and urbanization do not appear to confound this relationship. We also find evidence for a global diffusion process of nonviolent conflicts, for elections as a trigger for nonviolent conflict, and a strong relationship between education and nonviolent conflict in the NAVCO data.

This research, we posit, illuminates the causal processes driving the onset of nonviolent resistance movements. Doing so, it provides insight into how economic structures shape the possibilities for dissatisfied citizens to mobilize nonviolently against regimes. This research also provides a new angle on the relationship between modernization, conflict, and democratization. While modernization (expanding industrialization, urbanization, education, and wealth) has theoretical links to onset of social conflict, especially in the seminal work of Huntington (1968), scholars have generally failed to find robust empirical evidence to support this claim. Studies of civil war find that poor, marginalized ethnic groups initiate violent rebellion, not connected, urban groups with (comparatively) high incomes (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). Our study shows that modernization may indeed produce social conflict but of a nonviolent kind. We also find *positive* correlations between state-year measures of wealth, education, urbanization, and nonviolent conflict (when manufacturing is not included in the models). Most of these variables have negative associations with violent conflict. These findings also have implications for the study of democratization and the “conflict trap,” which we discuss in the conclusion.

The study proceeds as follows: first, we define nonviolent conflict and outline our argument linking nonviolence with organized labor. Second, we detail the method of analysis and choice of data. Third, the findings from the quantitative analysis are described and discussed. We conclude with a summary of the findings and outline areas for future research.

## **Theory: Nonviolence and Social Networks**

This section consists of three parts. First, we explain the notion of nonviolence. We then discuss, in the second and third parts, the different resource mobilization demands of violent and nonviolent tactics and how industrialization produces the types of social networks conducive to the use of nonviolent conflict.

Nonviolence is a contentious and normatively burdened concept.<sup>2</sup> We understand nonviolent conflict as a set of social and political methods utilized by opposition movements, beyond conventional politics or parliamentary processes, but short of violence (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Schock 2003, 2005). In line with this previous research, we hold major nonviolent resistance campaigns to mean a set of coordinated measures taken by individuals and organizations within a society, with the aim of overthrowing a government in power or seeking territorial autonomy or secession, that resist without utilizing physical violence.

We make some simplifying assumptions in the following discussion and advance a structural account of the onset of nonviolent campaigns. We assume that in a given state, there are dissidents planning to overthrow the regime. These dissidents are rational and responsive to costs and benefits. Where structural conditions make nonviolent means more feasible, we should see nonviolent campaigns emerging more frequently. We argue here that strategic nonviolence should be more feasible when extensive social networks that link people from diverse geographical and social backgrounds exist, and the state is economically dependent upon these networks.

### *Resource Mobilization for Violence and Nonviolence*

Drawing on resource mobilization theory, the feasibility of initiating a resistance campaign turns upon the ability of activists to mobilize the required resources. Much of the literature on civil war has focused on the feasibility of organized violence, and, therefore, the likelihood of it occurring (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Salehyan 2007; Blattman and Miguel 2010). Armed and unarmed dissident groups face different resource mobilization demands, however (Cunningham 2013, 294). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 39), along with Sharp (2005) Lohmann (1994) and Schock (2005, 2013), argue that the power of nonviolent means lies in mass participation. Nonviolence is most effective (and feasible) when dissidents can induce mass mobilization quickly and from across broad sectors of society, including across divisions such as ethnicity, class, and geography that may exacerbate collective action problems (DeNardo 1985; Beissinger 2013; Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Lichbach 1998, 158-59). Using nonviolent means, therefore, requires that activists overcome collective action problems at the individual level and the intergroup level (Goldstone 1994). Put another way, activists must convince individuals within their own groups that other people will participate, despite incentives to free ride, *and* must convince social groups that other social groups will participate. Unarmed insurrections are also more feasible when costs can be imposed on the regime without physically attacking it, what Schock calls “leverage” (Schock 2013; Summy 1994; Nepstad 2011; Sharp 2005). Strikes and boycotts, for example, are acts of strategic nonviolence that “hurt” by withdrawing resources and legitimacy from the regime.

Organized violence poses different resource demands in the initial stages. Violent movements must coordinate, pay, equip, train, and motivate a small number of individuals to physically attack a regime that commands superior military capabilities

and will retaliate (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013, 210). Violent insurgency demands extremely high-risk, high-cost military activity, and therefore, strong interpersonal bonds and trust to overcome intense, individual-level coordination problems, and manage infiltration risks (Hegghammer 2013). Violent insurgents do not, initially, have to induce participation from multiple social groups. Initiating a violent insurgency also requires weapons, sanctuary from government reprisals, and reliable finance to continue waging the conflict (Walter 2009, 249; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Salehyan 2007).

Social networks are crucial to resource mobilization in high-risk activism (McAdam 1986; Opp and Gern 1993; Parkinson 2013; McDoom 2013, 6). Social networks form preexisting mobilization infrastructures that nearly all dissidents exploit (Lichbach 1998, 142) and enable groups to control and diffuse information, overcome collective action problems (Lichbach 1998; Tullock 1971; Goldstone 1994), absorb and distribute resources (Pearlman 2011), and draw upon norms of in-group solidarity and trust (Gould 1993). While the mobilization potential of social networks has been widely acknowledged in the literature, less attention has been focused on which types of networks are more or less useful for violent and nonviolent tactics, given their different resource mobilization demands. Lichbach (1998, 146-47), for example, identifies an array preexisting social groups that have initiated dissent—peasants, workers, ethnic groups, religious groups, and students—each of which are embedded in differently structured social networks that may be more or less suited to different tactical choices. Here, we draw a highly idealized distinction between intensive and extensive social networks (see Siegel 2009). Intensive social networks have dense intragroup connections and high levels of intragroup trust, solidarity and reciprocity, or what Putnam (2000, 22-23) called “bonding capital” but few connections to other social groupings or “bridging capital.” Extensive networks may have dense intragroup connections but also have numerous connections across groups. In Putnam’s terms, they have both “bonding” and “bridging” capital. The more that social groups are linked, or networked with one another, the more extensive the social network.

Social networks can also be more or less economically interdependent with the state.<sup>3</sup> Where social networks are interdependent with the state, the regime draws resources from production within them, either through direct taxation, taxation of exchange occurring within the network, or profit from goods produced in the network. In this situation, social groups often have interests in the state maintaining economic growth or enforcing contracts, while the state has interests in the social group continuing to be economically productive. Economically isolated social networks produce little that the state appropriates. This is not to say that there may not be economically valuable resources in the geographical location of a social network, but that the social capital constituting that network does not, in sum, produce a surplus that benefits the state.<sup>4</sup>

Extensive, economically interdependent social networks are useful for strategic nonviolence. Extensive networks enable mass mobilization and the ability to solve

collective action problems at the individual and group level. Intragroup ties can generate interpersonal trust and facilitate the communication of protest activity to overcome collective action problems at the individual level (Marwell, Oliver, and Pahl 1988). Intergroup connectors (or bridging capital) allow the participation of groups to be communicated to other groups. Siegel (2009), for example, finds that increasing the number of intergroup connections among atomized social groups facilitates rapid mobilization for collective goods. Mathematical models of collective action generally point to the importance of “weak ties” between groups for mass mobilization (Granovetter 1973; Gould 1993). Where extensive networks are also integrated with the state, activists can potentially withdraw resources from the regime. Strikes and boycotts, for example, “hurt” the government more when absconding workers come from sectors that are central to the economy. While the literature is fairly scant, existing findings suggest that these claims are plausible. Cunningham (2013) finds that small, spatially dispersed separatist groups initiate nonviolent conflict, while Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Schock (2005) find that states dependent upon taxing the productive activity of citizens are vulnerable to mass protest movements.

Intensive, isolated social networks may be better suited to violent tactics. Dense intragroup bonds combined with few ties to other social groups may facilitate the formation of ascriptively based “out”-groups that are useful for generating powerful social sanctions and low-cost screening mechanisms, but are not useful for mass mobilization (Caselli and Coleman 2013; Lichbach 1998, 155; Hegghammer 2013). Economic isolation also leaves these groups with few nonviolent ways to hurt the regime. These factors may increase the expected utility of organized violence (or of maintaining the status quo). While the focus of this study is the onset of nonviolent conflict, previous research shows that poor, geographically concentrated, economically isolated and politically marginalized ethnic groups with cross border ties and patrons are most likely to initiate violent conflict (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Sambanis and Shayo 2013; Weidmann 2009; Cunningham 2013; Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2007; Buhaug 2010) and that familial, kinship, and neighborly ties predict participation in organized violence (McDoom 2013, 2; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008).

To summarize, we expect to see higher levels of organized nonviolence when there are extensive social networks that are economically integrated with the state. Strategic nonviolence is more feasible when people from diverse geographical, cultural, and social backgrounds are connected socially, and the state is economically dependent upon the sum of these social connections.

### **Hypotheses: Manufacturing and the Onset of Nonviolent Campaigns**

Based upon the previously mentioned reasoning, we argue that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to emerge in states with higher proportions of value-added

manufacturing to GDP. We advance a “modernization” argument to the effect that manufacturing creates (1) concentrated urban groups with dense interpersonal networks, (2) links *between* these urban agglomerations, and (3) economic interdependencies with the state. In other words, manufacturing creates “bonding” and “bridging” capital and spawns extensive social networks that are economically integrated with the state.

Manufacturing is closely linked with urban migration and enmeshes people from diverse geographic and cultural backgrounds into dense urban networks linked by factory-based work (Huntington 1968, 8). Seidman (1994, 5) points out, for example, that “major industrial cities in Russia and Germany were marked by militant trade unions with strong ties to urban communities” before the onset of the First World War. Potel (1982, 3) describes how ship manufacturing in the Gdansk region of Poland (where the “Solidarity” movement emerged in 1980) brought people from “every region of Poland” to work in the shipyards. These communities have, historically, facilitated mass collective action. Collier (1999, 173) points out that working-class participation in politics has coincided with expanding factory production, and Kurtz (2004, 272) argues that unionization is typically strongest and most powerful in the manufacturing sector.

Manufacturing also creates linkages *between* urban communities, creating extensive social networks, or “bridging capital.” “Trade Unions” are an obvious manifestation of the extensive networks that flourish with strong manufacturing sectors, but informal inter-factory networks can create the resources and space to initiate civil resistance where formal unions are banned (Collier 1999). In Brazil and South Africa, for example, a history of coordinated strike activity provided dissidents with an organizational infrastructure that was eventually exploited to challenge dictatorial and repressive regimes (Seidman 1994). Collier (1999, 184) points out that unions have unique resources that include “networks (both domestic and international), repertoires and historical memories of collective action, symbolic frames, culture, and . . . ongoing or ganization.” Anecdotally, labor-based organizations have played critical roles in the success of civil resistance movements in Iran (1979), the Philippines (1986), Indonesia (1997), and South Africa under apartheid (Zunes 1994), but appear to have played a lesser role in the success of violent movements.

The Solidarity movement that emerged in Poland in August 1980 provides a useful example of these processes. Before the strikes and protests of August 1980 in the Lenin Shipyard of Gdansk, Kubik (1994, 444) points to the importance of an “extensive and ever-growing network of people coming from all walks of life; a network with several knots” that coalesced around the coastal factories in Poland. This included a group of intellectuals (and priests) formed in 1976—the Workers Defense Committee (KOR)—and the Committee for Free Trade Unions formed in Gdansk in 1978 (Ash 1983, 22). Twenty thousand copies of KOR’s monthly newsletters, *Robotnik* and *Kommunicat*, were being distributed across the coastal factories by 1978 (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 128). Members of the Committee for Free Trade



Unions and one member of KOR, Bogdan Borusewicz, were present in Gdansk when the 1980 strike began (Ash 1983, 24; Goodwyn 1991; Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 141). Borusewicz was also connected to Jacek Kuron who had recent experience of coordinating nationwide strikes from his apartment in Warsaw. The first strikes spread quickly, as they were communicated to other coastal factories. KOR joined the workers in Gdansk and helped to set up the Inter-factory Strike Committee (Kubik 1994, 453). Within a week, the Inter-factory Strike Committee was coordinating the actions of thirty-six trade unions, and, by 1981, nearly 10 million Polish workers. Ash (1983, 24) claims that “the nationwide opposition network played a major role in helping discontented workers to generalize their grievances, formulate remedies, and co-ordinate their activities.” One Solidarity activist stated that “any idiot knows that whoever has the factories on his side has a weapon in his hands; whoever doesn’t is nothing more than a symbol, a moralist, a myth” (Lopinski, Moskit, and Wilk 1990, 200-1).

The state is also likely to be dependent upon either trade (domestically or internationally) in manufactured goods or on the wage earnings of manufacturing workers, as the size of the manufacturing sector grows in relation to GDP. These dependencies can be leveraged through strikes and boycotts, in addition to participation in rallies and tax noncompliance. Or, at least, workers withdrawing their production can slow the economy and withdraw legitimacy from the regime. Poland’s GDP was growing at around 2 percent in 1979, for example. In 1980, the year in which “Solidarity” was initiated, the Polish economy shrank by nearly 7 percent, then by 8 percent in 1981 and over 9 percent in 1982 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). The more important these resources are, the more vulnerable the regime is to mass nonviolence. Furthermore, these resources are difficult to substitute, given that manufacturing work often requires investment in skills and a large number of replacements.

The extensive, economically integrated social networks that emerge around manufacturing offer activists the capacity to link up with a preexisting mobilization infrastructure and to withdraw resources from the regime. Thus, we hypothesize that major nonviolent campaigns are more likely to emerge (*vis-à-vis* no campaign of any type) in states with strong manufacturing sectors than in states with weak manufacturing sectors. We also expect that states with strong manufacturing sectors will be no more or less likely to see violent campaign onset. This is because a strong manufacturing sector (an extensive and integrated network) can coexist with marginalized ethnic groups (an isolated and intensive network) that might make violent *and* nonviolent conflict more likely. In addition, if we observe that a strong manufacturing sector increases the risk of nonviolent movements but decreases, or is unrelated to the risk of violent movements, we take this as evidence of the feasibility mechanism we have described previously. It is possible that manufacturing creates grievances through visible urban inequality. If this were the case, however, we would expect manufacturing to increase the likelihood of *both* violent and nonviolent conflict. These hypotheses will now be tested empirically.

## Empirics

Two tests of the hypotheses were conducted using different measures of “major” nonviolent and violent campaigns. The unit of analysis is the country-year for all states from 1960 to 2009. Three outcomes are modeled: (1) no major challenge to the regime, (2) a violent resistance campaign, or (3) a nonviolent resistance campaign. Multinomial logit analysis was used to model the likelihood of these outcomes occurring independently (Greene 2011, 803). The dependent variable for the first battery of models is the onset of a major violent or nonviolent campaign as defined by the NAVCO 2.0 data (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). NAVCO records a nonviolent campaign when an organization with central leadership is able to challenge the government in a sustained way using primarily nonviolent methods. NAVCO requires a minimum of 1,000 participants and movements that are crushed in their nascency or that fizzle out early are not captured. This does not substantially bias our findings, as it movements that cross a minimum mobilization threshold that are of interest here. Our findings are robust to using the NAVCO 1.1 data (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Violent campaigns were also coded with the NAVCO 2.0 data. NAVCO defines a violent campaign as fighting between the government and an organized, armed sub-state group or groups that results in more than 1,000 battle-related deaths (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). The onset year was coded as for nonviolent campaigns, but where the primary means of resistance was violent. Country-years with ongoing campaigns have not been omitted because states remain at risk of another form of intrastate resistance during this period. Nonetheless, removing ongoing cases of nonviolent conflict does not substantially change the results reported here.

The second battery of tests uses the SCAD and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Data (ACD). This allows us to assess whether any findings are dependent upon the criteria used to identify campaigns in the NAVCO data. Restricting the sample to Africa reduces the number of observations but also reduces the error from comparing cases across regions that may have different causal mechanisms driving conflict onset. The onset of nonviolent conflict was coded when SCAD identifies the use of nonviolent tactics (peaceful demonstrations and strikes) targeted at the central government over issues of human rights/democracy or elections and involved more than 1,000 participants (Hendrix and Salehyan 2013). In this way, we approximate the NAVCO criteria for a “major” campaign seeking “maximalist” goals. More importantly, it rules out campaigns directed at issues that do not directly threaten the government’s hold on power and may require a lower mobilization potential. SCAD covers African states from 1990, and the sample is restricted from 1990 to 2009. To code the onset of violent conflict, we use the ACD data on civil war onset, version 4.10 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011; Gleditsch et al. 2002). A new conflict onset is coded when at least twenty-five battle-related deaths were recorded between the government and an organized rebel group and there was no conflict recorded in the previous year.

The importance of the manufacturing sector was operationalized with the World Bank's measure of value-added manufacturing as a proportion of GDP.<sup>5</sup> Manufacturing is defined as "the physical or chemical transformation of material, substances, or components into new products" and includes finished products, semi-finished products, and the assembly of parts manufactured elsewhere (United Nations 2008, 83). This definition includes the manufacture of food and beverages, textiles, chemicals, ships, motor vehicles, and the production of refined petroleum and can be broadly interpreted as a measure of "industrialization" (United Nations 2008, 83). Data are available from 1965 and are patchy, especially for the former Soviet Union. We used a "last known value" imputation procedure instead of letting these observations drop from the analysis. We imputed forward from the first known value to the next known value and then backward from the first known value to 1960. Countries with no data drop from the analysis. The results reported here are robust to other imputation procedures.<sup>6</sup> Manufacturing to GDP is lagged by one year because nonviolent campaigns may cause contractions or expansions in the size of the manufacturing sector.

We include control variables that may be associated with the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onsets and correlated with manufacturing. Population size is associated with violent and nonviolent conflict (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) and we include a logged measure of population ( $\ln\text{Population}_{t-1}$ ) from the World Bank Databank (WBD 2013). The models include a one-year lagged and logged measure of infant mortality ( $\ln\text{InfantMortality}_{t-1}$ ) from the WBD as a broad indicator of poor governance that may generate the "demand" for rebellion (Goldstone et al. 2010) and because nonviolent campaigns may be more feasible when there is a minimum level of organizational infrastructure provided by the state itself, especially in the form of a large public sector, which may be correlated with higher levels of manufacturing to GDP.

A one-year-lagged measure of institutional democracy/autocracy from the PolityIV project was included ( $\text{polity2}_{t-1}$ ) to control for the likelihood that democratic governments channel grievances through formal institutions and tolerate institutions of organized labor—something that is likely correlated with manufacturing to GDP (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011). A squared term was also included ( $\text{polity2squared}_{t-1}$ ). It may be that "anocracies" create incentives for violent and nonviolent insurgency by making political organization easier while reducing the threat of severe repression (Goldstone et al. 2010). A lagged dummy variable indicating whether the government politically or economically discriminated against minority groups ( $\text{State-ledDiscrimination}_{t-1}$ ) was included from the Minorities at Risk Data (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). Past repression may signal to activists and potential participants that future repression is likely.<sup>7</sup> Highly repressive regimes may also be less likely to cultivate a manufacturing sector that affords coordination goods to the populace.

Nonviolent campaigns may become more likely when the government signals that it is willing to compromise through movements toward democracy. Movements

toward democracy may also attract foreign investment in sectors such as manufacturing. The magnitude of change on the polity scale in the preceding three years was included to control for this (*RegimeChange1to3*). Elections may trigger nonviolent resistance, as they mobilize large segments of the populace to political action. When the results of elections are annulled or stolen, this may also provide the spark for widespread resistance, as was the case in Serbia in 1996 and 2000 (Beissinger 2007, 2013). We have included a dummy variable for whether there was an election in the county year (*election*) based on the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy data (NELDA; Hyde and Marinov 2012).<sup>8</sup> A cubic polynomial of the time since the last nonviolent (and violent) campaign was included to control for the likelihood that recent campaigns leave behind a mobilization infrastructure that makes future campaigns more likely or other unmeasured time dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010).<sup>9</sup> These variables were generated using the binary time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) software in STATA (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Large military forces may deter nonviolent campaigns or make it easier for the government to repress them in their infancy. Alternatively, large military forces may make it easier for nonviolent activists to induce defection from the armed forces, and large armed forces likely require a strong manufacturing industry for supply. We have included the lagged number of military personnel for a given state-year (*MilitaryPersonnel<sub>t-1</sub>*) from the National Material Capabilities Data version 4.0 at the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1987).<sup>10</sup>

Finally, we have included variables marking the number of nonviolent and violent campaigns that were initiated, globally in the relevant year (*NumberNonviolOnset*, *NumberViolOnset*, *NumberSCADOnset*, and *NumberUCDPOnset*). Activists may choose to take advantage of openings in the political opportunity structure signaled by the onset of campaigns elsewhere, and empirical studies show that nonviolent campaigns diffuse across countries (Beissinger 2007; Weyland 2012; Gleditsch and Celestino 2013).

We also include variables associated with “modernization” that may be correlated with manufacturing, in separate models. Urbanization is widely used as a measure of modernization. Manufacturing jobs are often located in urban areas and urbanization may help overcome collective action problems (Walton and Ragin 1990; Kurtz 2004; Arce and Bellinger 2007; Smith 2004). We have included a measure of the proportion of the population living in urban areas (*Urbanization*) from the WBD (2013) to control for this. Education is another indicator of modernization and we have included a measure of the average years of schooling per capita from the Barro and Lee (2010) data of educational attainment. Campante and Chor (2012, 175) identify sluggish economic growth and declining job opportunities as a trigger for popular protests. More generally, negative GDP growth may correlate with the onset of nonviolent conflict, especially in modernizing states (Smith 2004, 238). As discussed in the theory section, modernization should create economic interdependencies. Workers are dependent upon the state to maintain economic growth and the state is depended upon workers for production and taxation. In periods of strong


economic growth, trade unions may act conservatively. When the economy contracts and jobs are scarce, the opportunity costs for trade union-led protest should be lower. Data unavailability meant that we could not include the unemployment rate in our models.<sup>11</sup> We do include, however, GDP growth at year  $t-1$  with data from the Penn World tables 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012).

We conducted a number of robustness tests. We included a variable for fuel exports exceeding 33 percent of merchandise exports (using the same imputation procedure as for manufacturing as there is a very large amount of missing data), region fixed effects, government consumption, female literacy, and the proportion of trade and services to GDP. We also tested multinomial probit models and simplified models with manufacturing, population, and infant mortality. The results are not reported in the analysis below but are available in the Online Appendix accompanying this article. These robustness checks do not substantively change the results reported here.

In all, we run eight models—four on the global sample using the NAVCO data and four on the African sample using SCAD. The first model in both samples includes the control variables discussed, but not the modernization related variables. Model 2 restricts the sample to authoritarian states to examine whether our hypotheses hold in these “hard” cases. Authoritarian states are defined as those with scores less than or equal to 6 on the polity scale. Model 3 includes the “modernization” variables discussed previously. Model 4 uses random effects probit for the binary outcome of nonviolent campaign/no nonviolent campaign to parse out unobserved correlations between manufacturing and nonviolence due to the panel nature of the data. Models 1 to 3 have robust standard errors clustered on the country to minimize the effects of heterogeneity in the errors across states.

## Results

Figure 1 shows the distribution of values on the (lagged) proportion of manufacturing to GDP variable for all cases (red) and for cases where there was an onset of a major nonviolent campaign (blue) and the onset of a violent campaign (green). Two patterns stand out. First, only one major nonviolent campaign from 1960 to 2006 has occurred in a state with less than 6 percent of GDP generated by manufacturing, although there are a number of (mostly African) states that fit this category. Second, as the proportion of manufacturing to GDP increases in the full sample, the density of cases tapers off, but more slowly for nonviolent movements after about 25 percent manufacturing to GDP. By contrast, the distribution of violent campaigns follows the general distribution more closely. This potentially indicates that states with high proportions of manufacturing to GDP are more likely to see nonviolent campaigns and states with very low levels are less likely to do so. These patterns, however, may be accounted for by confounding variables discussed earlier. Table 1 shows the results of multinomial regression analysis for the onset of major nonviolent campaigns globally.



**Figure 1.** Distribution of global violent and nonviolent conflict onset by manufacturing value added to gross domestic product (GDP), 1960 to 2006.

Potential confounders do not appear to account for the patterns observed in Figure 1. Major nonviolent campaigns become more likely as the proportion of manufacturing to GDP increases, and this finding reaches conventional levels of statistical significance across our modeling strategies. Importantly, manufacturing to GDP remains significant in the sample of authoritarian states and when modernization-related variables are included. Manufacturing is negatively related to violent conflict in the global models, but the substantive effect is small and there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding these results. Interestingly, we find that a number of the modernization variables are significant when manufacturing is removed. Specifically, we find a negative and significant relationship between (log) infant mortality and nonviolent conflict onset if we exclude manufacturing, urbanization, and education from model 3 in Table 1. That is, as infant mortality *increases*, the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset *decreases*. The opposite relationship holds for violent conflict. When we include urbanization without manufacturing we do not find evidence of a strong relationship, but the positive and significant relationship between average schooling years per capita and nonviolent conflict onset remains significant. Again the opposite relationship holds for education and violent conflict (but it is not statically significant). Overall, we take Table 1 as supportive of our hypotheses and suggestive that manufacturing increases the feasibility of *specifically nonviolent resistance*. Taken with the results regarding

**Table 1.** Onset of Major Nonviolent Campaigns, NAVCO, 1960 to 2006.

Variable	Base model	Authoritarian	Modernization controls	Random effects
0 (Base Outcome)				
1 (Nonviolent Campaign Onset)				
InPopulation	0.454*** (0.111)	0.419** (0.139)	0.506*** (0.125)	0.455*** (0.121)
InInfantMortality <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.266 r(0.195)	-0.674** (0.230)	0.222 (0.398)	-0.267 (0.194)
Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.149*** (0.027)	1.114 (1.418)	-0.152*** (0.029)	-0.151*** (0.029)
Polity2Sqaured <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.020*** (0.005)	0.053 (0.097)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.005)
Manufacturing <sub>t-1</sub>	0.044** (0.015)	0.057** (0.020)	0.057** (0.018)	0.046* (0.019)
Election	0.774** (0.240)	0.256 (0.368)	0.682* (0.326)	0.770*** (0.269)
RegimeChangeI to3	0.049 (0.055)	0.063 (0.083)	0.051 (0.067)	0.048 (0.037)
MilitaryPersonnel <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
State-led Discrimination <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.257 (0.283)	-0.256 (0.365)	-0.411 (0.304)	-0.259 (0.279)
NonViolStabilityYears	0.075 (0.128)	-0.102 (0.124)	0.260 (0.138)	0.075 (0.100)
NonViolStabilityYears2	-0.000 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)
NonviolStabilityYears3	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
ViolStabilityYears	-0.002 (0.123)	0.063 (0.145)	-0.039 (0.140)	-0.001 (0.100)
ViolStabilityYears2	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.005)
ViolStabilityYears3	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
NumberNonViolOnsets	0.180*** (0.024)	0.180*** (0.032)	0.177*** (0.030)	0.180*** (0.026)
NumberViolOnsets	-0.041 (0.093)	0.064 (0.098)	-0.081 (0.119)	-0.048 (0.080)
UrbanPopulation			-0.011 (0.010)	
Education			0.242** (0.089)	
GDP Growth (t-1)			-0.010 (0.023)	
Constant	-12.449*** (2.289)	-4.936 (5.310)	-17.105*** (3.140)	-12.565*** (2.429)

**Table 1.** (continued)

Variable	Base model	Authoritarian	Modernization controls	Random effects
<b>2 (Violent Campaign Onset)</b>				
InPopulation	0.376*** (0.084)	0.361** (0.137)	0.435*** (0.118)	
InInfantMortality <sub>t-1</sub>	0.817* (0.333)	0.460 (0.426)	0.722 (0.413)	
Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.607 (1.453)	-0.011 (0.025)	
Polity2Squared <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.035 (0.093)	-0.009 (0.005)	
Manufacturing <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.039)	-0.020 (0.032)	
Election	-0.020 (0.283)	-0.065 (0.405)	0.125 (0.292)	
RegimeChangeI to3	0.018 (0.047)	0.097 (0.090)	0.012 (0.054)	
MilitaryPersonnel <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	
State-led Discrimination <sub>t-1</sub>	0.829*** (0.244)	0.989*** (0.348)	0.458 (0.250)	
NonViolStabilityYears	-0.014 (0.095)	0.020 (0.141)	-0.031 (0.101)	
NonViolStabilityYears2	0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.005)	
NonviolStabilityYears3	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	
ViolStabilityYears	-0.035 (0.075)	-0.115 (0.157)	0.079 (0.082)	
ViolStabilityYears2	0.002 (0.005)	0.012 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.005)	
ViolStabilityYears3	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	
NumberNonViolOnsets	-0.038 (0.053)	0.036 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.050)	
NumberViolOnsets	0.312*** (0.040)	0.354*** (0.060)	0.316*** (0.042)	
UrbanPopulation			0.010 (0.012)	
Education			-0.181 (0.124)	
GDP Growth (t-1)			-0.065*** (0.017)	
Constant	-14.458*** (2.506)	-15.475* (7.552)	-14.914*** (3.387)	
N	5,576	2,340	4,616	5,576

Note: These are likely to be conservative estimates. We obtain stronger results when looking at only onsets over government, and when we exclude highly developed states. See the Online Appendix for these results.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .




infant mortality, education, and urbanization, it appears that social conflict takes more nonviolent forms as states become more “modernized.”

Table 1 reveals further patterns. Nonviolent movements are more likely in populous states, corroborating Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013). Moves toward institutional democracy decrease the chances of nonviolent campaign onset, although movements toward “anocracy” increase them (and violent conflict), perhaps because they both allow for some popular mobilization without meeting societal demands for change (Hegre et al. 2001), although this could be an artifact of middle-range regimes being contaminated by a measure of political violence in PolityIV (Vreeland 2008). Elections appear to be a trigger for nonviolent campaigns, but not violent campaigns. Authoritarian states are an exception, where elections are unrelated to nonviolent campaign onset.<sup>12</sup> Nonviolent campaigns tend to cluster in time, with activists emulating the success or initiation of campaigns elsewhere. Finally, we find that state-led discrimination appears unrelated to nonviolent conflict across all of our models but is related to the onset of violent conflict.

Changes in the proportion of value-added manufacturing to GDP appear to have substantive impacts on the likelihood nonviolent campaign onset. The quantities of interest reported below were calculated using the simulation method in CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).<sup>13</sup> With all values held at their means, the simulated probability of a nonviolent campaign is very low, just 0.32 percent. Increasing the proportion of manufacturing by one standard deviation (from 15.3 percent to 24.1 percent) increases the probability to 0.47 percent, a 47 percent increase. In addition, the lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval indicates a positive effect.

Figure 2 compares the effects of a one standard deviation increase in each of the nontemporal variables in model 3 of Table 1 (modernization controls) from their mean.<sup>14</sup> The probability of nonviolent campaign onset increases by 0.15 percent when manufacturing to GDP is increased and the lower bound of this difference is greater than zero at the 95 percent confidence level. Education has the largest substantive impact on nonviolent conflict onset. Regarding manufacturing, the mean first difference is smaller than for the same proportional increase (log) population, and institutional changes toward democracy or anocracy, but is comparable with the number of concurrent nonviolent campaigns globally, and larger than the presence of an election, state-led discrimination, military personnel, and infant mortality.

Turning to nonviolent conflicts in Africa, Table 2 shows further support for our hypotheses. Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP is positively and significantly related to the onset of nonviolent protest across our modeling strategies. Like in the global sample, manufacturing appears to have the largest effect in the sample of authoritarian states. Table 2 also shows that manufacturing is negatively related to the onset of civil war, but this result does not satisfy conventional tests of statistical significance. We do not find the same relationship between the other modernization-related variables and nonviolent conflict onset in the African sample. With manufacturing removed from model 1 in Table 2, we do find a negative relationship between



**Figure 2.** First differences, effects of a one standard deviation increase on the onset of nonviolent campaigns, 1960 to 2006.

infant mortality and nonviolent conflict that approaches statistical significance (significance = .291), but no significant relationship with education or urbanization when we add these variables in separately. We do find a significant negative relationship between education and violent conflict, along with the significant positive relationship between infant mortality and violent conflict. Taken together, these results suggest that in poor, authoritarian African states the mobilization opportunities offered by the manufacturing industry play an important role in determining whether grievances will manifest as violent or nonviolent conflict. The results also suggest that while “modernization” dampens the prospects of violent conflict, the clear nexus between education, wealth, and nonviolent conflict observed in the global data is not as clear in Africa from 1990 to 2009.

Other results from Table 2 are worth a brief mention. Population is positively and significantly related to nonviolent conflict, as are elections, but, like in the global data, not in authoritarian states. Larger militaries appear to deter nonviolent protest, but only in authoritarian states and when modernization variables are not included.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 3 shows that manufacturing has a comparatively strong effect on the likelihood of nonviolent conflict in Africa.<sup>16</sup> Increasing the level of manufacturing to GDP by one standard deviation increases the probability of onset from 10.96 percent to 15.36 percent with all variables held at their means. The lower bound of the 95 percent confidence interval on this first difference is above zero, increasing the confidence that the effect is indeed positive. Population again has a strong impact, further corroborating the findings of Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) on a different sample. Manufacturing, however, has the next strongest effect on civil resistance


**Table 2.** Nonviolent Protest (SCAD) and UCDP Civil War Onset, Africa, 1990 to 2009.

Variable	Base model	Authoritarian	Modernization variables	Random effects
0 (Base Outcome)				
1 (Civil Resistance Event Onset)				
InPopulation	0.500*** (0.111)	1.329*** (0.326)	0.373** (0.138)	0.418** (0.151)
InInfantMortality <sub>t-1</sub>	0.025 (0.328)	1.557 (0.947)	-0.183 (0.512)	0.258 (0.394)
Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub>	0.000 (0.022)	-3.385 (3.731)	0.016 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.025)
Polity2Squared <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.240 (0.254)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
RegimeChangeIto3	0.011 (0.027)	0.018 (0.079)	0.023 (0.028)	0.004 (0.025)
Manufacturing <sub>t-1</sub>	0.054** (0.019)	0.147** (0.051)	0.054* (0.022)	0.047* (0.020)
Election	0.709** (0.216)	0.855 (0.502)	0.868*** (0.252)	0.489* (0.206)
MilitaryPersonnel <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.008 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
State-led Discrimination <sub>t-1</sub>	0.501 (0.256)	0.066 (0.472)	0.506 (0.301)	0.685* (0.276)
SCADStabilityYears	-0.388* (0.153)	0.470 (0.274)	-0.355* (0.174)	-0.233 (0.129)
SCADStabilityYears2	0.033 (0.024)	-0.088 (0.044)	0.023 (0.027)	0.027 (0.020)
SCADStabilityYears3	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
UCDPStabilityYears	0.156 (0.140)	-0.039 (0.258)	0.040 (0.165)	0.106 (0.132)
UCDPStabilityYears2	-0.019 (0.021)	0.021 (0.036)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.013 (0.018)
UCDPStabilityYears3	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
NumberSCADOnsets	0.023 (0.042)	-0.062 (0.051)	0.012 (0.047)	0.035 (0.036)
NumberUCDPOnsets	-0.042 (0.047)	0.114 (0.110)	-0.043 (0.054)	-0.008 (0.040)
UrbanPopulation			-0.009 (0.011)	
Education			-0.022 (0.116)	
GDP Growth <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.027 (0.017)	
Constant	-10.021*** (2.392)	-44.845*** (17.078)	-6.433 (3.317)	-9.950*** (2.832)

**Table 2.** (continued)

Variable	Base model	Authoritarian	Modernization variables	Random effects
2 (UCDP Civil War Onset)				
InPopulation	-0.047 (0.155)	-0.103 (0.260)	-0.171 (0.267)	
InInfantMortality <sub>t-1</sub>	1.456 (0.751)	3.873*** (0.833)	0.216 (1.146)	
Polity2 <sub>t-1</sub>	0.062 (0.038)	-6.566 (6.809)	0.054 (0.033)	
Polity2Squared <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.467 (0.484)	-0.023 (0.013)	
RegimeChange1to3	-0.020 (0.019)	0.049 (0.087)	-0.012 (0.019)	
Manufacturing <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.019 (0.040)	-0.008 (0.048)	-0.000 (0.045)	
Election	-0.074 (0.366)	-2.546 (1.712)	0.241 (0.487)	
MilitaryPersonnel <sub>t-1</sub>	0.002 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.010)	
State-led Discrimination <sub>t-1</sub>	0.881 (0.472)	0.586 (0.775)	1.141* (0.499)	
SCADStabilityYears	-0.078 (0.198)	-1.818* (0.848)	-0.323 (0.268)	
SCADStabilityYears2	0.017 (0.026)	0.475* (0.212)	0.026 (0.044)	
SCADStabilityYears3	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.000 (0.002)	
UCDPStabilityYears	-0.088 (0.256)	-0.151 (1.556)	-0.255 (0.323)	
UCDPStabilityYears2	0.002 (0.042)	0.203 (0.478)	0.024 (0.058)	
UCDPStabilityYears3	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.021 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.002)	
NumberNwOnsets	0.043 (0.057)	0.127 (0.261)	0.096 (0.084)	
NumberUCDPOnsets	0.003 (0.053)	0.504 (0.293)	-0.097 (0.064)	
UrbanPopulation			-0.006 (0.016)	
Education			-0.335 (0.249)	
GDP Growth			0.030* (0.015)	
Constant	-8.231* (3.914)	-48.696 (24.883)	2.104 (6.902)	
N	940	265	708	940

\*p &lt; .05. \*\*p &lt; .01. \*\*\*p &lt; .001.



**Figure 3.** First differences, effects of a one standard deviation increase on the onset of nationwide protest campaigns in Africa, 1990 to 2009.

events and these impacts are distinguishable from zero. Variables commonly associated with violent conflict have small and insignificant effects on civil resistance events when compared to manufacturing. These include state-led discrimination, recent institutional changes, and infant mortality.

### **Concluding Discussion: Modernization, Democratization, and Nonviolent Conflict**

Our main finding is a positive relationship between the size of the manufacturing sector and the onset of nonviolent conflict. This result was replicated across the two leading data sets of civil resistance events—NAVCO and SCAD. We argue that organized labor produces extensive social networks that combine “bridging” and “bonding” social capital in addition to creating economic interdependencies with the state that satisfy the resource demands of nonviolence—mass mobilization from across society and the mobilization of people that are capable of nonviolently hurting the regime.

The findings of this study speak to some of the major debates in political science. Samuel Huntington proposed in 1968 that modernization would produce violent conflict as the forces of participation outstripped the capacity of the state to meet new demands for representation. This link between modernization and conflict has its roots in the works of Marx and Engels ([1888] 1998), who proposed that industrial development created new class-based social arrangements that would inevitably come into conflict. Deutsch (1953), Gellner (1983), and Anderson (1983) also

forwarded the idea that economic modernization causes “nations” to be defined along ethnic lines, thus paving the way for ethnic violence. Studies of violent conflict, however, have generally failed to find a cross-national link between modernization and civil war. More robust is the finding that poor states experience civil war, not states in the “middle” income range. These results have been replicated in this study. What we find, however, is a robust link between indicators of modernization and *nonviolent* conflict, proxied here as the proportion of manufacturing to GDP. Thus, both poverty and modernization may produce social conflict, but they produce different forms.

This study also speaks to debates concerning modernization and democratization. Previous research has linked higher incomes with democratization (see Vanhanen 1990; Wucherpfennig 2009). Studies also point to a role for organized labor (Collier 1999), the threat of revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001), and capital mobility and inequality (Boix 2003) in the democratization process. Parallel to this research, studies have shown that regime transitions effected through nonviolent means result in postconflict democracies more often than when violent methods are used (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). Combined with this previous work, our study suggests that industrialization creates structural conditions that increase the feasibility of nonviolent tactics by creating extensive and economically integrated social networks. When regimes are challenged in this way, they are more likely to fall and democracies are more likely to emerge from the debris. Thus, we provide evidence of the causal mechanism linking modernization to democratization proposed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) but demonstrate that this causal path likely centers on the role of organized labor as proposed by Collier (1999). Indeed, our results challenge some of the claims in Przeworski and Limongi (1997, 177) who suggest that modernization does not cause transitions from autocracy to democracy, rather, when modernized autocracies transition to democracy, they are much more likely to survive as democracies. We do not question the latter result, but our study does suggest that modernization enables dissidents to use tactics of mass protest that increase the probability of regime changes and stable postconflict democracy. That manufacturing has a significant and substantive relationship with nonviolent conflict in the sample of autocratic states in our results increases our confidence in this interpretation.

If modernization, nonviolent conflict, and democratization are part of the same causal chain, then our results also speak to research examining the “conflict trap,” that is, the tendency for violent conflicts to recur. We know that civil wars set back economic development (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003) and low levels of economic development are correlated with the repeated onset of civil wars (Walter 2004). Violent conflict also probably destroys “bridging” social capital by disabling the growth of intergroup linkages and, potentially, by entrenching exclusionary identities (Sambanis and Shayo 2013). As such, it cuts off nonviolent ways for citizens to pressure regimes into democratization. States may remain in a cycle of violence

because violence is the most feasible tactic in a situation where intensive, isolated social networks predominate.

Finally, our study has methodological implications. If violent and nonviolent campaigns emerge in different circumstances and actors strategically choose to initiate their favored type of campaign when the conditions are right, then we may question how comparable violent and nonviolent campaigns are in terms of success. Nonviolent campaigns tend not to emerge where the structural conditions are unfavorable. What would be the probability of success if group with an intensive, isolated social network chose to use nonviolence? And how would this compare with the success of a violent campaign? Furthermore, recent studies have shown that nonviolent revolutions are more likely to result in stable postconflict democracies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). Our results suggest that nonviolent conflicts may be more likely to emerge in “modernized” environments conducive to the consolidation of democracy (Wucherpfennig 2009). Future research might include the array of conditions identified here to tease out these effects.

This study points to other potentially fruitful areas of future research. First, we have not tested the causal mechanisms in this article. We believe it is plausible that activists draw upon extensive economically interdependent social networks for their tactical utility in initiating nonviolent campaigns, but we have not interviewed or surveyed activists to obtain their perceptions of these strategic choices. Research should also examine the effect of economic conditions on the outcome (e.g., success in terms of full or partial regime overthrow) of nonviolent resistance campaigns, adding to the impressive body of knowledge that has grown from systematic studies in the last years (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2005; Nepstad 2011). We see potential links between the ability of activist to link up with economic networks and factors such as the resilience of movements under repression (e.g., see Francisco 2004). Moreover, whether economic conditions can help to explain shifts “from bombs to banners,” that is, from violent forms of resistance to nonviolent manifestations may be a useful avenue for future enquiry (Svensson and Lindgren 2011; Dudouet 2013). Finally, nonviolent resistance campaigns vary considerably in their forms, and it is plausible that different types of nonviolent campaigns emerge from states with differently structured economic systems, which we leave to future research to examine.

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## Notes

1. Asal et al. (2013) examines a regionally restricted sample; Cunningham (2013) restricts the analysis to self-determination disputes.
2. For an overview of the literature, see Carter (2009) and Schock (2013).
3. Schock (2013) and Summy (1994) point out that dependency relations can also be political and moral.
4. Examples of extensive, isolated networks might include proportionally large religious groups. An intensive, integrated social network might be an ethnic group privileged with resource extraction contracts.
5. The definition of manufacturing is based on the International Standard industrial Classification, revision 3, divisions 15 to 37.
6. Specifically, if we do not impute back to 1960 and if we use no imputation at all.
7. For this variable, we imputed forward from 2003 based on the last known value. We also tested this with a one year lagged measure of Physical Integrity Rights and obtained results significant at, at least, the 0.10 level regarding the manufacturing variable (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). We find no significant relationship between integrity rights and nonviolent conflict onset.
8. For the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset (SCAD) data, we imputed this variable forward from 2006 to 2009 based on previous election patterns and schedules.
9. These variables are labeled: NonViolStabilityYears, NonViolStabilityYears<sup>2</sup>, NonViolStabilityYears<sup>3</sup>, ViolStabilityYears, ViolStabilityYears<sup>2</sup>, ViolStabilityYears<sup>3</sup>, SCADStabilityYears, SCADStabilityYears<sup>2</sup>, SCADStabilityYears<sup>3</sup>, UCDPStabilityYears, UCDPStabilityYears<sup>2</sup>, UCDPStabilityYears<sup>3</sup>.
10. For the SCAD analysis, we have imputed forward for 2008 and 2009 based on 2007 values.
11. The Online Appendix accompanying this article reports the results of a model including the unemployment rate. Even with the missing data problem, we still find a significant relationship between manufacturing and nonviolent campaign onset.
12. Other studies find elections in authoritarian states trigger protest in certain circumstances (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Schedler 2013, chap. 9). These differences are likely due to the different dependent variables and substantive focus of these studies and ours. Nonviolent conflict may cause elections to take place, but examples, especially in the former Soviet Union, suggest that this relationship is not endogenous (Beissinger 2007).
13. The CLARIFY method draws a sample of 1,000 coefficients from a multivariate normal distribution to reflect the range of possible coefficients that may obtain from the model and their likelihood of being drawn. These coefficients are then used to generate various quantities of interest. In this case, we estimated the predicted probability of campaign onset.



14. The temporal variables were not included because the effect varies across the range of time since the onset of the last nonviolent campaign.
15. This is probably due to missing data on the “average schooling” variable.
16. These figures come from model 1 in Table 2.

### Supplemental Material

The online [appendices/data supplements/etc] are available at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental>.

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