CHAPTER TWO THE PRIMACY OF PARTICIPATION IN NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

What is a rebel? A man who says no. ALBERT CAMUS

WHAT EXPLAINS THE SUCCESS of nonviolent resistance campaigns relative to violent campaigns? We argue that a critical source of the success of nonviolent resistance is mass participation, which can erode or remove a regime's main sources of power when the participants represent diverse sectors of society. All resistance campaigns—violent and nonviolent—seek to build the personnel bases of their campaigns. Personnel are recruited for their special skills, knowledge, material resources, and their willingness to fight and support the resistance. The quantity and quality of campaign participation is a critical factor in determining the outcome of resistance struggles (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1994; Weinstein 2007; Wickham-Crowley 1992).

This chapter has two aims. First, we establish that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to attract higher levels of participation than violent campaigns because the barriers to participation are lower. Second, we argue that high levels of participation in resistance campaigns can activate numerous mechanisms that improve the odds of success. Such mobilization is not always manifested in the form of mass rallies and street demonstrations but rather can manifest in numerous forms of social, political, and economic noncooperation. The tactical and strategic advantages of high levels of diverse participation explain—in large part—the historical success of nonviolent campaigns.

PARTICIPATION DEFINED

We define participation in a resistance campaign as the active and observable engagement of individuals in collective action. As such, when measuring campaign participation, we use estimated counts of observed individuals.¹ Instead of constructing cumulative counts, which would be nearly impossible, we count the maximum number of estimated participants that participated in peak events in the campaign. For example, if a resistance

law.

campaign holds mass protests in, say, September with 12,000 people, November with 24,000 people, and December with 20,000 people, we use the November figure for our estimate. That is, we code that particular campaign as having 24,000 participants. We use estimates of armed participants to generate figures about the level of participation in violent insurgencies.² Of the 323 resistance campaigns analyzed in this book, we were able to collect reliable membership data for 259 campaigns—80 nonviolent and 179 violent—by referencing multiple sources that estimated the maximum number of participants in each campaign.³

This is a rather strict conceptualization of participation, and we recognize that many forms of participation are impossible to observe, such as providing sanctuary, food, and supplies to guerrillas, raising funds, communicating messages, acting as informants, or refusing to cooperate with government attempts to apprehend insurgents. For instance, for some individuals, simply refusing to report the presence of guerrillas in one's village to state police may be a form of participation in a resistance campaign, albeit one that is more passive and impossible for us to quantify. Recent studies have identified multiple and complex levels of such participation. As Roger Peterson writes, "there are collaborators, neutrals, locally based rebels, mobile fighters, and gradations in between" (2001, 8).

We do not dispute that our definition likely misses many unobserved participants, but we find the definition both necessary and justified for two reasons. First, in our definition of nonviolent resistance participation, civilians are the active and primary prosecutors of the conflict, executing nonviolent methods against the adversary with varying degrees of risk. This is quite different from the typical conception of civilians as serving a supportive role to combatants.

Second, we assume that some types of unobservable participation occur in approximately equal measure in both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns. Out of necessity, we focus exclusively on the participants that make themselves visible to observers and opponents as a rough measure of campaign mobilization. The risks of visibility should be similar for both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns, which in our study often involve illegal and at times high-risk actions against powerful and repressive adversaries.

We do wish to avoid the misconception, however, that civil resistance always assumes the form of mass protests in the streets. Nonviolent resistance is just as likely to take the form of stay-aways, sit-ins, occupations, economic boycotts, and so forth, in which the numbers of participants are extremely difficult to estimate. When such estimations are possible because of reliable recording of such events, we include them in our figures.

HOW TO MOBILIZE?

Mass mobilization occurs for many different reasons, which multiple scholars have analyzed in great depth (see, for instance, Kalyvas 2006; Peterson 2001). In this chapter, we do not seek to explain why mobilization occurs. Rather, we argue that once mobilization begins, a nonviolent resistance campaign has wider appeal than a violent one, thereby enlarging the personnel base of the former and bringing more assets and resources to the fight against a state opponent.

Skeptics may disagree. It is often argued, for instance, that violent insurgencies provide immediate results—such as loot, prestige, score settling, or territorial gains—that give them more appeal than nonviolent resistance. Beyond the prospect of achieving political objectives, the potential to obtain material payoffs from resistance leaders, to seize territory and weapons, to gain control over lucrative extractive industries, trade, and trafficking routes, to inflict casualties, or to exact revenge are factors that may attract some recruits to violent resistance.

The psychosocial dimensions of participation in armed conflict have similarly attracted a great deal of attention. Frantz Fanon famously advocated armed resistance on the grounds that it bestows feelings of communal solidarity through actively fighting against injustice while being willing to die for a cause greater than self (Boserup and Mack 1974; Fanon 1961).⁴ Violence may have its own attraction, especially for young people, for whom the allure may be further perpetuated by cultural references and religious defenses of martyrdom (Breckenridge 1998).⁵

Despite its supposed appeal, however, the resort to violence is rare at both individual and group levels and therefore may not have the allure that some theorists ascribe to it (Collins 2008, 20). On the whole, physical, informational, commitment, and moral considerations tend to give nonviolent campaigns an advantage when it comes to mobilizing participants, which reinforces the strategic benefits to participation.

We have found strong evidence suggesting that nonviolent campaigns have been, on average, more likely to have a larger number of participants than violent campaigns. The average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000

PEAK MEMBERSHIP	YEARS	LOCATION	TARGET	ТҮРЕ	OUTCOME
4,500,000	1937-45	CHINA	JAPANESE OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	FAILURE
2,000,000	1978-9	IRAN	PAHLAVI REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
2,000,000	1983-6	PHILIPPINES	MARCOS REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1,000,000	1988	BURMA	MILITARY JUNTA	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
1,000,000	2006	MEXICO	CALDERON REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
1000000	2005	LEBANON	SYRIAN INFLUENCE	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1993-9	NIGERIA	MILITARY REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1989	CHINA	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
1000000	1984-5	BRAZIL	MILITARY RULE	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1967-8	CHINA	ANTI-MAOISTS	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1922-49	CHINA	NATIONALIST REGIME	VIOLENT	SUCCESS
700000	1990-1	RUSSIA	ANTI-COMMUNIST	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
700000	1983-9	CHILE	PINOCHET REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
550000	1956-7	CHINA	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
500000	2002-3	MADAGASCAR	RADSIRAKA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	1989	UKRAINE	KUCHMA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	2001	PHILIPPINES	ESTRADA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	1989	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	1963	GREECE	KARAMANLIS REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
400000	1991-3	MADAGASCAR	RADSIRAKA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
400000	1953	EAST GERMANY	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
400000	1941-45	SOVIET UNION	NAZI OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	FAILURE
340000	1958-75	VIETNAM	U.S. OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	SUCCESS
300000	1990-5	NIGERIA	NIGERIAN REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
300000	1944	POLAND	NAZI OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	FAILURE

TABLE 2.1 TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS, 1900-2006

members—about 150,000 more active participants than the average violent campaign. A look at the twenty-five largest campaigns yields several immediate impressions. First, twenty of the largest campaigns have been nonviolent, whereas five have been violent. Second, of the nonviolent campaigns, fourteen have been outright successes (70 percent), whereas among the five violent campaigns, only two have been successful (40 percent). In other words, among these massive campaigns, nonviolent campaigns have been much more likely to succeed than violent campaigns.⁶

The Iranian Revolution of 1977–1979 is illustrative. Although violent insurgencies such as those of the fedayeen and mujahideen had resisted the Shah since the 1960s, they were able to attract only several thousand followers. Pahlavi's regime crushed the armed groups before they produced meaningful change in the regime. The nonviolent revolution that emerged between 1977 and 1978, however, attracted several million participants and included nationwide protests and boycotts involving all sectors of society that paralyzed the economy and eroded the Shah's most important pillars of support.

These trends are further borne out in the data set. Nonviolent campaigns are persistently associated with higher levels of membership, even when controlling for the population size of the entire country. Consider table 2.2, which shows the effects of a nonviolent resistance type on the number of participants, controlling for population size.⁷ Thus nonviolent resistance campaigns have been associated with higher levels of participation. In this section, we argue that the physical, informational, and moral barriers to participation are lower in nonviolent campaigns than in violent campaigns.

Physical Barriers

Active participation in a resistance campaign requires variable levels of physical ability. The physical risks and costs of participation in a violent resistance campaign may be prohibitively high for many potential members.

TABLE 2.2 THE EFFECT OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE ON NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS

	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED
RESISTANCE IS PRIMARILY NONVIOLENT	2.26*** (.29)
POPULATION, LOGGED	.23* (.13)
CONSTANT	6.70*** (1.17)
N	163
PROB > F	.0000
R ²	.3543

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS: *** P < .01, ** P < .05, *P < .1; ORDINARY-LEAST-SQUARES REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AROUND TARGET COUNTRY.

Actively joining a violent campaign may require physical skills such as agility and endurance, willingness to train, ability to handle and use weapons, and often isolation from society at large. While certain of these qualities, including endurance, willingness to sacrifice, and training are also applicable to participation in nonviolent resistance, the typical guerrilla regimen may appeal only to a small portion of any given population.

Physical barriers to participation may be lower for nonviolent resistance since the menu of tactics and activities available to nonviolent activists is broad and includes a wide spectrum, ranging from high-risk confrontational tactics to low-risk discreet tactics.⁸ Generally, participation in labor strikes, consumer boycotts, lockdowns, and sit-ins does not require strength, agility, or youth. Participation in a nonviolent campaign is open to female and elderly populations, whereas participation in a violent resistance campaign is often, though not always, physically prohibitive. Although female operatives—such as female suicide bombers and guerrillas—have sometimes been active in violent campaigns in Sri Lanka, Iraq, Pakistan, Palestine, El Salvador, and East Timor, they are nevertheless exceptions in most cases.

Informational Difficulties

Scholars have found that individuals are more likely to engage in protest activity when they expect large numbers of people to participate (Goldstone 1994; Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1989; Kurzman 1996, 2004; Lichbach 1994; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1994; Olson 1965; Rasler 1996; Schelling 1978; Tullock 1971). To successfully recruit members, campaigns must publicize their activities to demonstrate their goals, abilities, and existing numbers to potential recruits. Because of the high risks associated with violent activity, however, movement activists may be limited in how much information they can provide. They may need to remain underground, thereby exacerbating informational problems. Although violent acts, including assassinations, ambushes, bombings, and kidnappings, are public and often attract significant media attention providing signals of the campaign's abilities, the majority of the campaign's operational realities-including information about the numbers of active members-often remain unseen and unknown.9 The absence of visible signs of opposition strength is, therefore, problematic from the perspective of recruitment. Thus violent resistance may be at a disadvantage in this regard, since the actual number of activists may not be explicit. The counterargument, of course, is that dramatic acts of violence achieve a bigger bang for the buck. Whereas nonviolent organization requires communication and coordination involving larger numbers of people, a single suicide bomber can wreak great damage while attracting significant media attention at relatively little cost. Violent campaigns often rely on propaganda materials that try to exaggerate their size and strength to attract recruits. In the propaganda realm, violent campaigns may have a tactical advantage over many nonviolent campaigns.

On the other hand, nonviolent, public tactics have important demonstration effects, which help address the informational problem. Nonviolent campaigns sometimes include clandestine activities (e.g., the use of samizdat underground publications during the Polish Solidarity struggle, or the actual planning of nonviolent campaigns by the leadership), particularly during the early stages when the resistance is most vulnerable to regime repression and decapitation. Typically, however, nonviolent campaigns rely less on underground activities than do armed struggles.¹⁰ When communities observe open, mass support and collective acts of defiance, their perceptions of risk may decline, reducing constraints on participation. This contention is supported by critical-mass theories of collective action, which contend that protestors base their perceptions of protest opportunities on existing patterns of opposition activity (Kurzman 1996, 154). Courage breeds courage, particularly when those engaged in protest activities are ordinary people who would be conformist, law-abiding citizens under typical circumstances. Media coverage amplifies the demonstration effects of their acts of defiance.

Another factor that enhances participation in nonviolent campaigns is the festival-like atmosphere that often accompanies nonviolent rallies and demonstrations—as exemplified by the recent nonviolent campaigns in Serbia, Ukraine, Lebanon, and Egypt—where concerts, singing, and street theater attracted large numbers of people (particularly young people) interested in having fun while fighting for a political cause. Humor and satire, which have featured prominently in nonviolent campaigns (less so in armed campaigns), have helped break down barriers of fear and promote solidarity among victims of state-sponsored oppression (Kishtainy 2010).

Moral Barriers

Moral barriers may constrain potential recruits to resistance campaigns, but such constraints may inhibit participation in nonviolent resistance far less than participation in violent activities. Although an individual's decision to resist the status quo may follow a certain amount of moral introspection, taking up weapons and killing adds a new moral dimension. Unwillingness to commit violent acts or to support armed groups necessarily disqualifies segments of the population that sympathize with the resistance but are reluctant to translate that sympathy into violence.^{II} For violent resistance campaigns, the leadership may need to rely on the proportion of the population that is willing to use violence against the adversary and its supporters, while settling for sympathy and passive support from the rest of the population.

Nonviolent resistance campaigns, however, can potentially mobilize the entire aggrieved population without the need to face moral barriers. Although the moral quandaries associated with nonviolent resistance might involve putting at risk one's freedom, family well-being, life and livelihood, joining such a campaign "requires less soul-searching than joining a violent one. Violent methods raise troublesome questions about whether the ends justify the means, and generally force the people who use them to take substantial risks" (DeNardo 1985, 58).

Commitment Problems

Beyond physical, informational, and moral barriers, nonviolent resistance campaigns may offer an opportunity to participate to people with varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance. Campaigns that rely primarily on violent resistance must depend on participants who have high levels of both commitment and risk tolerance for four principal reasons.

First, the new recruit to a violent campaign may require more training than a recruit to a nonviolent campaign, creating a lag between volunteering and participation. This lag—and the strenuous requirements for participation in a violent campaign—may reduce the number of people who join a violent campaign on a whim.¹²

Second, violent campaigns typically enforce higher levels of commitment at the outset. Screening potential participants is much more intense in violent movements. Often new recruits to violent movements must undertake a violent act to demonstrate their commitment. This is a further inhibition to participation in armed struggles, because potential recruits may wish to eschew drastic screening processes or movement leaders may find it hard to trust new recruits.

Third, during the prosecution of a conflict, participants in nonviolent campaigns can often return to their jobs, daily lives, and families with lower risk than a participant in a violent campaign.¹³ Compared with those in armed struggle, participants in civil resistance can more easily retain anonymity, which means that they can often commit acts of resistance without making major life sacrifices. This is particularly true when a campaign uses nonviolent methods of dispersion (a concept we elaborate on later), such as stay-at-home strikes or a consumer boycott, in which cooperation is withdrawn without providing the state with a tangible target for repression (Burrowes 1996, 224–25; Schock 2005, 52). The commitment required by people who join violent campaigns often prevents them from resuming their lives during or after the conflict, and they are more likely to go underground to evade state security.

Fourth, nonviolent resistance offers a greater repertoire of lower-risk actions. Although nonviolent struggle is rarely casualty-free, as the nonviolent struggle in Egypt recently demonstrated, the price of participating (and being caught) in armed struggle is often death. The possibility of accidental death during training exercises or through friendly fire is omnipresent as well. Thus the likelihood of being killed while carrying out one's duties as an armed insurgent is high, whereas many lower-risk tactics are available to participants in a nonviolent resistance campaign. The wearing of opposition insignia, the coordinated banging of pots and pans and honking of horns, the creation of underground schools, participation in candlelight vigils, and the refusal to obey regime orders are a few examples of less-risky nonviolent tactics that have been used by groups around the world (Sharp 1973).

Mobilization during the Iranian Revolution demonstrates the latter point. Notwithstanding the Shah's deep unpopularity among large numbers of Iranians, many Iranian citizens were unwilling to participate in protest activity until the revolution had attracted mass support, which occurred only after nonviolent popular struggle replaced guerrilla violence as the primary mode of resistance (Kurzman 1996). A similar dynamic could be seen in the 1988 popular ouster of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile, and the 1986 People Power revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, where armed challenges to the dictatorships invited harsh regime reprisals without attracting mass support or threatening the regime's grip on power, whereas nonviolent actions opened up space for broad-based, multisectoral participation (Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Boudreau 2004; Schock 2005).

The dynamics of participation discussed thus far point in one direction. They suggest that nonviolent campaigns will be more successful at generating large bases of participants. When large numbers of people in key sectors of society stop obeying and engage in prolonged acts of social, political, and economic disruption, they may fundamentally alter the relationship between ruler and ruled. If mass participation is associated with campaign success, then nonviolent campaigns have an advantage over violent ones.

PARTICIPATION AND SUCCESS GO TOGETHER

We have established how and why nonviolent resistance campaigns are able to attract a larger number of active participants than violent struggles. But is mass participation truly important? After all, many regimes specialize in controlling large populations. Some might suspect that a smaller number of well-armed comrades competing against an unsuspecting military and government could have better odds than a million unarmed protestors engaging a repressive opponent (see, e.g., DeNardo 1985). This expectation is certainly corroborated by several empirical examples: the Cuban Revolution shows the success of small, armed bands, whereas the massacre at Tiananmen Square demonstrates the failure of a large-scale nonviolent campaign.

The data, however, reveal a different pattern. Over space and time, large campaigns are much more likely to succeed than small campaigns. A single unit increase of active participants makes a campaign over 10 percent more likely to achieve its ultimate outcome.¹⁴ Consider figure 2.1, which shows the effects of number of participants per capita on the predicted probability of campaign success. The trend is clear that as membership increases, the probability of success also increases.¹⁵

We recognize, however, that numbers alone do not guarantee victory in resistance campaigns. As some cases demonstrate, a high number of participants does not automatically translate into success. Some enormous campaigns—like the anticommunist campaigns in East Germany in the 1950s (boasting about four hundred thousand participants) and the anti-Japanese insurgency in China during the 1930s and 1940s (with over 4 million participants)—failed utterly.

Thus, numbers may matter, but they are insufficient to guarantee success. This is because the quality of participation—including the diversity of the resistance participants, strategic and tactical choices made by the opposition, and its ability to adapt and innovate—may be as important as the quantity of participants. As proposed in the preceding, lower barriers to participation enjoyed by nonviolent campaigns will increase not only the size of the campaign but also the diversity of the campaign. The more diverse the participation in the resistance—in terms of gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ideology, profession, and socioeconomic status—the more difficult it is for the adversary to isolate the participants and adopt a repressive strategy short of maximal and indiscriminate repression. Of course, this does not mean that nonviolent campaigns are immune from regime repression—typically they are not—but it does make the opponent's use of violence more likely to backfire, a point we return to later.

Moreover, thick social networks among members of the resistance and regime actors, including members of the security forces, may produce bonds that can become very important over the course of the resistance. Diverse participation also increases the likelihood of tactical diversity, since different groups and associations are familiar with different forms of resistance and bring unique skills and capacities to the fight, which makes outmaneuvering the opponent and increasing pressure points more plausible.

As with any campaign, strategic factors like achieving unity around shared goals and methods, establishing realistic goals, assessing opponent




FIGURE 2.1 THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION ON THE PROBABILITY OF CAMPAIGN SUCCESS

vulnerabilities and sources of leverage, sequencing tactics, and navigating structural constraints (including regime repression) are also likely to be crucial determinants of campaign outcomes. These strategic factors are independent of the mechanisms we develop in the following but can affect whether the mechanisms actually translate into effectiveness. We emphasize these features more prominently in our case studies. In the meantime, however, we suggest that the execution of any resistance strategy—violent or nonviolent—and the ability to stay in the contest with the adversary depend on the availability of willing recruits.

As such, large-scale and diverse participation may afford a resistance campaign a strategic advantage, which, in turn, increases the pressure points and enhances the leverage that the resistance achieves vis-à-vis its state adversary. The ability of nonviolent campaigns to more easily exploit these advantages of broad-based mobilization, and the high costs of prolonged disobedience and noncooperation by large numbers of dissenters, explain in part why civil resistance has been so much more effective than violent resistance.

PARTICIPATION AND MECHANISMS OF LEVERAGE

In this section, we discuss the mechanisms through which broad-based mobilization and the systematic application of nonviolent sanctions by large numbers of people allow nonviolent campaigns to maximize leverage over their adversaries, even when their adversaries appear to have an advantage in terms of military prowess, resources, and other forms of power. Leverage, writes Kurt Schock, is "the ability...to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for power" (Schock 2005, 142). Thus leverage is not necessarily dependent on the number of weapons available to a resistance movement but on the ability of the campaign to impose costs on the adversary for maintaining the status quo, or for retaliating against the resistance.

The disruptive effects of violent and nonviolent resistance may raise the political, economic, and military costs for an adversary (DeNardo 1985). The results of sustained disruption include the failure of the government to perform basic functions, a decline in GDP, investment, and tax revenues, loss of power by government elites, and the breakdown of the normal order of society (Wood 2000, 15). The sum total of the domestic and international costs of sustained disruption may cause members of the target regime to accommodate resistance campaigns—or force them to give up power completely.

Coercion

Violent campaigns physically coerce their adversaries, which may significantly disrupt the status quo.¹⁶ Destroying or damaging infrastructure, killing or threatening government and military elites and local populations, and disrupting the flow of goods and commerce may raise perceptions of ungovernability and continued instability while loosening the regime's grip on power. The more the regime is perceived as illegitimate by the local populace, the more likely it is that the latter will sympathize with the armed insurgents, as the revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, and the ongoing Pashtun-led armed resistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrate. But sympathy is not the same as active participation in the resistance.

Beyond attempting to coerce the opponent, a sustained violent resistance campaign may serve an important communicative role. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) use of terrorism and guerrilla violence from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s is often credited with keeping the Palestinian issue alive internationally. The armed wing of the East Timorese independence movement, the Falintil, similarly used armed attacks against Indonesian military targets to attract media attention and to demonstrate that there was opposition to the Indonesian occupation. The Iranian guerrilla movement similarly justified its use of armed attacks against the Shah's regime as a way of demonstrating that the reality was not as the Shah presented it, and that there was opposition to the monarchy (Behrooz 2004). The Maoist guerrillas in Nepal launched armed attacks against the monarchical regime for years, signaling their opposition and resulting in hundreds of fatalities and prolonged instability in the country.17 The Taliban continue to use suicide bombings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and assassinations targeting International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Afghan government officials and security forces to demonstrate their rejection of the internationally backed regime of President Hamid Karzai.

In the aforementioned cases, however, there is scant evidence of a causal relationship between political violence and political victories, suggesting that disruption should not be confused with victory. Although the armed resistance may have had a symbolic function, many of the major changes that have ultimately occurred in these cited cases—except in Afghanistan, where the insurgency continues—were precipitated by mass, nonviolent campaigns. In the case of Nepal, for instance, what directly preceded the restoration of democratic rule in Nepal was not armed resistance but a brief mass civil resistance campaign, where even the Maoists chose to put down their guns so that they could participate alongside large numbers of unarmed civilians.

The coercive capacity of nonviolent resistance is not based on violent disruption to the social order. Rather, it is based on the removal of the adversary's key sources of power through sustained acts of protest and noncooperation. Some may argue that nonviolent resistance is powerful only because regimes fear that they will become violent, thereby posing even greater threats. Social movement scholars refer to this dynamic as a "positive radical flank effect." This concept posits that violence may sometimes increase the leverage of challengers, which occurs when states offer selective rewards and opportunities to moderate competitor groups to isolate or thwart the more radical organizations. In other words, the presence of a radical element in the opposition may make the moderate oppositionists in the nonviolent campaign seem more palatable to the regime, thereby contributing to the success of the nonviolent campaign. In this way, some argue that violent and nonviolent campaigns can be symbiotic, in that the presence of both types improves their relative positions.¹⁸

But opposition violence is just as likely—if not more likely—to have the opposite result. A "negative radical flank effect," or spoiler effect, occurs when another party's violence decreases the leverage of a challenge group. In this case, the presence of an armed challenge group causes the regime's supporters to unify against the threat without making a distinction between violent and nonviolent challenges, which are lumped together as the same threat deserving the same (violent) response.

There is no consensus among social scientists about the conditions under which radical flanks either harm or help a social movement.¹⁹ In our estimation, however, many successful nonviolent campaigns have succeeded because they systematically eroded or removed entirely the regime's sources of power, including the support of the economic and military elites, which may have hesitated to support the opposition if they had suspected that the campaign would turn violent. The more a regime's supporters believe a campaign may become violent, or that their interests will be gutted if the status quo is changed, the more likely that those supporters and potential participants may perceive the conflict to be a zero-sum game (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 9–13). As a response, regime supporters are likely to unite to counter the perceived threat, while potential participants may eschew participation for the reasons just identified. A unified adversary is much harder to defeat for any resistance campaign. In conflicts perceived as zerosum, furthermore, it is difficult for erstwhile regime supporters to modify and adapt their ideologies and interests according to shifts in power. Instead, they will fight tooth and nail to keep their grip on power, relying on brutal force if necessary. There is less room for negotiation, compromise, and power sharing when regime members fear that even small losses of power will translate into rolling heads. On the other hand, our central point is that campaigns that divide the adversary from its key pillars of support are in a better position to succeed. Nonviolent campaigns have a strategic advantage in this regard.²⁰

To summarize, rather than effectiveness resulting from a supposed threat of violence, nonviolent campaigns achieve success through sustained pressure derived from mass mobilization that withdraws the regime's economic, political, social, and even military support from domestic populations and third parties. Leverage is achieved when the adversary's most important supporting organizations and institutions are systematically pulled away through mass noncooperation.

For example, sustained economic pressure targeting state-owned and private businesses and enterprises has been an important element in many successful popular movements (Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999). As the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa demonstrated, massive collective actions such as strikes and boycotts can impose significant economic costs on those benefiting from the status quo.²¹

As in South Africa, the cumulative costs of continuous nonviolent resistance may limit the possible or desirable courses of action available to economic and political elites, often forcing them to negotiate on terms favorable to the nonviolent campaign. Sustained pressure through civic mobilization, combined with the belief that the opposition represents a burgeoning and viable governing alternative, can influence key regime adherents, causing them to reconsider their preferences and alternatives to the status quo (Wood 2000, 21). This dynamic has marked a number of democratic transitions, including those in Chile, the Philippines, and Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005; Bernhard 1993; Brownlee 2007; Collier 1999; Eckstein 2001; McFaul 2007; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973).

In cases where there is an inverse economic dependency relationship (meaning the opposition is more dependent on the state than vice versa) it may be difficult for a civil resistance campaign to achieve significant leverage without working through parties with closer political and economic ties to the state. Examples of nonviolent campaigns in this circumstance are the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Tibetans in China-controlled Tibet, and the West Papuans in Indonesian-controlled West Papua, all of whom are more economically dependent on the state than vice versa. Although consumer boycotts and labor stoppages launched by populations living under foreign occupation can impose certain degrees of economic costs on the occupying power (as occurred when Palestinians boycotted Israeli products and withheld labor during the First Intifada), the impact is much smaller than when the regime is more economically dependent on the resisting population, as is the case with many nonviolent campaigns challenging regimes (Dajani 1994; King 2007; Stephan 2005, 2006). This may be especially true when a state is subsidized from the outside such that it can survive internal economic disruption.²² These so-called rentier states, which rely on external sources, including export sales in natural resources, tourism, and economic aid for a sizable portion of net income, have proven to be especially resistant to domestic pressure (Carothers 1999; Carothers and Ottoway 2005; Diamond 2008; Ibrahim 2008).

An inverse dependency relationship between a state and a nonviolent campaign does not doom the nonviolent campaign to failure, however. In a number of antiauthoritarian struggles, economic crises combined with organized mass nonviolent pressure have led to the ouster of regimes reliant on external rents believed to be immune to such pressure (e.g., Iran, Indonesia). In certain cases of foreign occupation, working with or through third parties has helped nonviolent campaigns to "extend the nonviolent battlefield" and gain increased leverage over its adversary.²³

Violent campaigns, we suggest, are more likely to reinforce the adversary's main pillars of support and increase their loyalty and obedience to the regime, as opposed to pulling apart and reducing their loyalties to the regime. A "rally around the flag" effect is more likely to occur when the adversary is confronted with violent resistance than with a disciplined nonviolent campaign that makes its commitment to nonviolent means known. Although small armed groups may be perceived as threatening to a regime's survivability, states may be more susceptible to internal fissures in the face of massive nonviolent action than to limited, violent opposition. In short, campaigns of nonviolent resistance tend to enjoy mass, broad-based support and, in some cases, mass defections by erstwhile regime supporters, who see a future in supporting a growing opposition movement as opposed to supporting the regime or a relatively small group of armed oppositionists.

Loyalty Shifts

When a resistance campaign is able to influence the loyalties and interests of people working in society's dominant institutions, it increases its chances of success (Greene 1974, 57; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 306). Campaigns can shift power relations vis-à-vis the adversary by accessing sympathizers or defectors within the elite or among ordinary people who work below the elite. Regimes often grant concessions when acts of protest or noncooperation lead to shifts in people's loyalties and interests—or perceptions thereof. Thus measuring the impact of different forms of resistance on the loyalties and interests of a regime's key pillars of political and military support may help to predict campaign success and failure.

Evidence of defections within the ranks of the military, for instance, would suggest that the regime no longer commands the cooperation and obedience of its most important pillar of support. We generated a dichotomous variable that identifies defections among a regime's security forces. This measure does not include routine individual defections but rather large-scale, systematic breakdowns in the execution of a regime's orders.²⁴ We consider security defections a strict measure of loyalty shifts within the regime, not capturing civil servant or bureaucrat loyalty shifts. This strict measure includes defections occurring up to the end of the campaign.

The ability to produce divisions among elites may be augmented when the resistance has widespread participation. With a large number of participants, the chances for kinship ties or other social networks linking members of the elite to the larger civilian population increase. The importance of even loose ties between regime elites and the resistance is illustrated by Srdja Popovic, a member of the student group Otpor in Serbia. Popovic made the following observations regarding the relationship between Milosevic's police and the mass, nonviolent resistance movement that was pressuring the regime to stand down following stolen elections in 2000: We were producing the [*sic*] sympathy in the wider audience . . . It was quite normal to produce in people who are parents because they can recognize their own children in Otpor activists. But as for the police, we tried three times to approach them and third time it was useful [*sic*]. First time, we developed a message . . . Our message was "there is no war between police and us." Somebody else is misusing the police against students. It's abnormal. There is no reason for the police to fight against the future of this country—and we were repeating that and repeating that in our public actions. (Popovic 2009)

Popovic's mention of members of the regime as "parents" of some of the Otpor activists underscores the importance of wide networks that link members of society to members of the regime itself. As other scholars have shown, the larger the resistance, the more likely such networks exist, with meaningful links between the regime and the resistance (Binnendijk 2008; Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Jaafar and Stephan 2010). This is another reason why the actions and proclivities of a state's security forces—the military and the police—are barometers of the strength of the opposition movement. We illuminate this point in the case study section of the book.

While their demands strain state budgets, nonviolent campaigns may also lead soldiers, policemen, and (often later) their commanding officers to question the viability, risks, and potential costs of military actions against the nonviolent campaign (Hathaway 2001). This occurred within the ranks of the Iranian armed forces during the anti-Shah resistance, to Filipino armed forces during the anti-Marcos uprising, within the Israeli military during the First Intifada, and over the course of the Indonesian military campaign in East Timor, to take but a few examples. Fighting an armed actor is likewise costly but is less likely to create as much introspection among the commanding officers, who might instead feel physically threatened by the violence and view the violent insurgents as minorities within the population resorting to violence out of desperation or a desire to inflict punishment. Regime functionaries are therefore less likely to see violent protestors as potential bargaining partners than with nonviolent groups.

Among economic elites within the regime, perception of costly continued conflict may convince them to pressure the regime to adopt conciliatory policies toward the resistance. Wood argues that the accumulating costs of the insurgencies in South Africa and El Salvador and their attendant repression ultimately convinced economic elites to press the regimes to negotiate, changing the balance of power within the regimes between those willing to consider compromise and those resolutely opposed (2000, 6).

If our theory is correct, nonviolent campaigns should be more successful at inducing loyalty shifts within the regime than violent campaigns, especially nonviolent campaigns with mass participation. We tested this hypothesis by measuring whether there were significant shifts in loyalty among state security forces during the course of a campaign.³⁵

The results in Model 1(a) in table 2.3 suggest that large campaigns with a commitment to nonviolent resistance are more likely than violent insurgencies to produce defections within security forces. In fact, the largest nonviolent campaigns have about a 60 percent chance of producing security-force defections, an increase of over 50 percent from the smallest nonviolent campaigns. The substantive effects of nonviolent campaigns on security-force defections are visible in figure 2.2. For nonviolent campaigns, the probability of security-force defections steadily increases as membership in the resistance campaign grows. On the other hand, the odds of successfully converting military forces to the insurgent side remain between 10 percent and 40 percent for violent insurgents, with only a modest increase in probability as participation increases. Faced with a violent insurgency, security forces are likeliest to unify behind the regime, as the fight becomes a contest of brute force rather than strategic interaction. Under such conditions, security

MODEL 1(A)	PROBABILITY OF SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED	. 25** (.11)	+5%
POPULATION, LOGGED		
NONVIOLENT* PARTICIPANTS	18 (.14)	
CONSTANT	-1.77 (1.56)	26%
N	163	
CHI ²	5.52	
PROB > CHI ²	.0632	
PSEUDO R ²	.0413	

TABLE 2.3 THE EFFECT OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE ON MECHANISMS

MODEL 2(A)	PROBABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE REGIME	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN	3.50** (3.35)	+62%
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED	.64*** (.22)	+10%
POPULATION, LOGGED	01 (.12)	
NONVIOLENT* PARTICIPANTS	42** (.32)	
CONSTANT	-7.16*** (2.46)	20%
N	163	
CHI ²	10.59	
PROB > CHI ²	.0315	
PSEUDO R ²	.0842	
MODEL 3(A)	PROBABILITY OF STATE SPONSORSHIP	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN	-2.72*** (.77)	-44%
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED	.29** (.15)	+6%
POPULATION, LOGGED	25** (.12)	-5%
CONSTANT	37 (1.82)	26%
N	163	
CHI ²	17.55	
PROB > CHI ²	.0005	
PSEUDO R ²	.1569	

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS: *** P < .05, *P < .1; LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AROUND TARGET COUNTRY CODE.

forces may become even more loyal to the regime, or the regime may purge ambivalent troops from its ranks.

But security-force defections are only the most extreme form of loyalty shifts in an opponent regime. We cannot quantify the noncooperation of civilian bureaucrats, economic elites, and other members of society whose withdrawal of consent from the regime may be critical to the outcome of a resistance campaign. But such groups may be even more threatened by violent insurgency than the military, which can provide its personnel with nominal physical protection. One might expect civilian bureaucrats to be even more inclined toward regime loyalty when faced with a violent insurgency. They may be more introspective, though, faced with a mass, nonviolent campaign.




FIGURE 2.2 THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION ON SECURITY-FORCE DEFECTIONS

Backfiring

Loyalty shifts may occur directly in response to opposition activities, or in response to regime actions that are perceived as unjust or excessive. One common scenario leading to loyalty shifts is when the regime violently cracks down on a popular nonviolent campaign with mass civilian participation. In this case, the regime's actions may backfire, a process that occurs when an action is counterproductive for the perpetrator (Martin 2007, 3). Backfiring creates a situation in which the resistance leverages the miscalculations of the regime to its own advantage, as domestic and international actors that support the regime shift their support to the opposition because of specific actions taken by the regime (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, 416).²⁶

Repressing nonviolent campaigns may backfire if the campaigns have widespread sympathy among the civilian population by turning erstwhile passive supporters into active participants in the resistance (DeNardo 1985, 217). Alternatively, repressing nonviolent activists may lead to loyalty shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance, increasing foreign support for it, or increasing dissent within the enemy ranks—provided violent counterreprisals by the resistance do not occur. This effect may be catalyzed further if the repression is communicated to domestic and international audiences that are prepared to act (Boserup and Mack 1974, 84; Martin 2007; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).²⁷

Resistance of any kind against a regime is often met with repression. In fact, in our data set, 88 percent of all campaigns met with violent resistance from their adversaries. However, it is easier for states to justify violent crackdowns and draconian measures (like the imposition of martial law or states of emergency) to domestic and international audiences when they are challenged by an armed insurgency (Martin 2007, 163).²⁸ On the other hand, converting, co-opting, or successfully appealing to the interests of those targeted with violence is more difficult, because, as mentioned, regime members and security forces are more likely to think defensively in the face of a violent threat (Abrahms 2006). This explanation is counterintuitive, because it is often assumed that violent repression always *weakens* nonviolent campaigns relative to violent campaigns (Schock 2003, 706).

If we are correct, then a nonviolent strategy should be more likely to succeed against a repressive opponent than a violent strategy. We test this hypothesis in Model I(b) in table 2.4. The results suggest that when regimes crack down violently, reliance on a nonviolent strategy increases the probability of campaign success by about 22 percent. Among the campaigns we explore here, backfiring may be an important mechanism through which nonviolent campaigns achieve success.

MODEL 1(B)	PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS, WHEN REGIME CRACKS DOWN	
NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN	.92*** (.36)	+22%
POPULATION, LOGGED	20* (.12)	-5%
CONSTANT	1.21 (1.08)	41%
N	181	
CHI ²	8.27	
PROB > CHI ²	.0160	
PSEUDO R ²	.0453	

TABLE 2.4 THE EFFECTS OF MECHANISMS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

TABLE 2.4 (CONTINUED)

MODEL 2(B)	PROBABILITY OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED	.49** (.17)	+9%
VIOLENT REGIME REPRESSION	76 (.80)	
SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS	3.18*** (.74)	+58%
STATE SPONSORSHIP	.97 (1.43)	
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS	99 (1.23)	
CONSTANT	-4.20** (1.97)	57%
N	80	
CHI ²	24.33	
PROB > CHI ²	.0002	
PSEUDO R ²	.2953	

MODEL 3(B)	PROBABILITY OF VIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED	11 (.13)	
VIOLENT REGIME REPRESSION	98 (.64)	
SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS	.18 (.40)	
STATE SPONSORSHIP	.86** (.48)	+15%
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS	.82 (.62)	
CONSTANT	.00 (1.37)	21%
N	178	
CHI ²	11.10	
PROB > CHI ²	.0494	
PSEUDO R ²	.0614	

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS: *** P < .01, ** P < .05, *P < .1; LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AROUND TARGET COUNTRY CODE.

International Sanctions and External Support

A resistance campaign may also achieve leverage over its adversary through diplomatic pressure or international sanctions against the adversary. International sanctions are certainly controversial; common arguments against them include the point that they often harm the civilian population more than the targeted regimes (Cortright 2007; Seekins 2005).²⁹ They may be effective, however, in many cases (Marinov 2005). Such sanctions had discern-

ible effects in supporting successful opposition campaigns in South Africa and East Timor, to take just two examples (Martin 2007, 13, 15, 23). The ANC leadership had demanded sanctions for decades, but they came about only after mass nonviolent resistance had spread.³⁰ Some argue that the international sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa were critical in creating a bargaining space for the resistance campaigns to finally come to the negotiating table.³¹

Conversely, lack of sanctions or diplomatic pressure has often been cited as contributing to the failure of some opposition groups. Some have suggested, for example, that the application of sanctions by China or Russia would hasten the Burmese junta's downfall, or that pressure by South Africa would hasten the demise of the Robert Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe (Seekins 2005; U.S. State Department 2004). Absent economic and diplomatic backing from China, the Kim Jong II regime in North Korea would be on weak footing. Arab regimes in places like Saudi Arabia and Egypt benefit tremendously from Western (notably U.S.) political, economic, and military support.

International sanctions may be more easily generated when outside actors see large numbers of resistance participants as a sign of the movement's legitimacy and viability. The international repercussions of a violent crackdown against civilians who have made their commitment to nonviolent action known may be more severe than against those that could be credibly labeled as terrorists. We believe that the international community is more likely to contribute diplomatic support to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones.

To test our thinking, we drew upon international sanctions data collected by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1992).³² In Model 2(a) in table 2.3, we measure the effects of nonviolent resistance and campaign membership on the likelihood that international sanctions will be applied against the opponent of the resistance movement.

The data show that large, nonviolent campaigns are likelier than small, armed campaigns to successfully receive international diplomatic support. Once again, it is not only the quantity of participants in terms of their numbers but also the reliance on civil resistance that leads to diplomatic support through sanctions. A nonviolent campaign is 70 percent likelier to receive diplomatic support through sanctions than a violent campaign.

State sponsors may also give direct assistance to resistance campaigns, depending on the political context and domestic conditions. Specifically, outside states may choose to contribute arms or financial assistance to an insurgency when they have mutual interests with the insurgents. Pakistan and the United States, for example, supported the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan during the 1980s because both countries wished to see the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Nonviolent campaigns also sometimes receive direct support from foreign governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and global civil society. The aid often comes in the form of government financial assistance, sanctions targeting the adversary, diplomatic recognition or other forms of support for leading opposition activists, or NGO funding or training.³³ The Serbian resistance movement Otpor, for example, received millions of dollars from funding agencies linked to the United States and European governments prior to the toppling of the Milosevic regime.

We find, however, that foreign governments are likelier to lend direct material support to violent resistance campaigns—which the states may see as their proxies—than to nonviolent campaigns.³⁴ Whereas 35 percent of the violent insurgencies received material support from a foreign state, less than 10 percent of nonviolent campaigns did so.

As Model 3(a) in table 2.3 identifies, holding other potential confounding variables constant, violent resistance campaigns are over 40 percent likelier to receive material support from a foreign state sponsor than nonviolent campaigns.

The aid of an external donor may help violent insurgents to wage successful campaigns against more powerful adversaries (Record 2006).³⁵ Many would argue, for example, that Franco's revolutionary fascists would have been defeated by the Spanish Republicans without the support of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

Ironically, however, external state support may also undermine insurgents' odds of success. State support is unreliable, inconsistently applied to opposition groups around the world, and sometimes ineffective in helping campaigns. States are fickle, as the PLO learned when Jordan expelled it in 1970. States are also known to attach many conditions to their aid, greatly complicating the strategic maneuverability of different actors (Byman 2005). Even when state sponsorship could be helpful to a campaign, as Clifford Bob notes, the decision to support resistance movements depends on a variety of internal considerations, including the donor's mission, sponsors, and the political atmosphere (2005).

State support may also create a free-rider problem, in which local populations perceive that participation in the campaign is unnecessary because of foreign patronage. In fact, external support can at times delegitimize a movement in the eyes of the domestic population by leading to accusations of corruption within the movement. Alternatively, foreign support may drive away potential recruits who may be reluctant to act on behalf of a foreign state or to be associated with a foreign state's political designs.

State support may also undermine insurgent incentives to treat civilian populations with restraint, because civilians are viewed as dispensable rather than as the main sources of support. As Weinstein argues, for instance, insurgencies that must rely on local populations to finance the insurgency are much likelier to treat such populations with restraint and respect (2007). Insurgencies that obtain resources from elsewhere—such as from natural resource deposits or foreign donors—are much more likely to abuse the local population, thus undermining the ultimate goals of the insurgency.

Thus state support may be a double-edged sword, rife with trade-offs for insurgent groups. While it may provide violent insurgencies with more war matériel with which to wage the struggle, it may also undermine the relationship between the insurgency and the civilian population, a population whose support may be critical to the outcome of the campaign. Civil resistance movements, which by definition rely on civilian support for mobilization, do not face this conundrum, since over 90 percent of them execute their campaigns without the direct financial assistance of a foreign regime.

Tactical Diversity and Innovation

Strategic innovation occurs with some regularity in both nonviolent and violent campaigns. However, we suggest that the greater the number of participants from different societal sectors involved in the campaign, the more likely the campaign is to produce tactical innovations. Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Kurt Schock have argued that tactical innovation occurs "on the margins of existing repertoires," and as such, "the more expansive the margins, the greater the likelihood of permutation and innovation" (Schock 2005, 144). We have already pointed out that nonviolent campaigns attract a larger number of more diverse participants than violent campaigns because the physical, moral, and informational barriers to mobilization are lower. The diversity of these campaigns therefore offer them advantages with regard to tactical innovation (Schock 2005, 144).

A specific type of tactical diversity is shifting between methods of concentration and methods of dispersion. In methods of concentration, nonviolent campaigns gather large numbers of people in public spaces to engage in civil resistance (Schock 2005, 51). Well-known applications of this method include the Gandhi-led Salt March in India, the student protests in Tiananmen Square, and the occupation of Red Square during the Russian Revolution. More recent examples of concentration methods include the mass sitins in Maidan Square in Kiev during the Orange Revolution, the creation of a tent city in downtown Beirut during the Lebanese Independence Intifada (also known as the Cedar Revolution), and the massive gatherings of Egyptians in Tahrir Square during the 2011 revolution. Methods of dispersion involve acts that spread out over a wider area, such as consumer boycotts, stay-aways, and go-slow actions at the workplace. Dispersion methods, like the consumer boycotts in South Africa, intentional obstructionism at the workplace by Germans during the French occupation of the Ruhr, labor strikes by oil workers during the Iranian revolution, and the banging of pots and pans by Chileans during the anti-Pinochet movement, force an adversary to spread out its repressive apparatus over a wider area, afford greater protection and anonymity to participants, and allow participants to engage in less-risky actions.

In violent campaigns, tactical diversity could include alternating between concentrated attacks and ambushes in urban areas and more dispersed hitand-run attacks, bombings, and assassinations in smaller towns and villages. The Taliban's shift from direct engagements to reliance on IEDs targeting Afghan and international coalition forces is an example of tactical innovation in armed resistance. For both violent and nonviolent campaigns, adopting diverse tactics reduces the effectiveness of the adversary's repression and helps the campaign maintain the initiative (Schock 2005, 144). Tactical innovation enhances the campaign's adaptability and its room for maneuvering when the state focuses its repression on a particular set of tactics. This is especially crucial when the repression makes some tactics, like street protests, highly risky and dangerous (Schock 2005, 144).

Because tactical innovation occurs on the fringes of a movement, campaigns with larger numbers of participants, and consequently wider margins, are more likely to produce tactical innovations. The relatively larger number of active participants expands the repertoire of sanctions available to nonviolent campaigns, allowing them to shift between methods of concentration and dispersion while maintaining pressure on the adversary.³⁶ Tactical diversity and innovation enhance the ability of nonviolent resistance to strategically outmaneuver the adversary compared with armed insurgencies. Tactical innovation in turn affects the resilience of campaigns over time, an issue we take up in the next section.

Evasion and Resilience

Another significant challenge of resistance is opposition resilience, which "refers to the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities" (Schock 2005, 142). Researchers can observe levels of resilience by determining a campaign's ability to maintain a significant number of participants, recruit new members, and continue to confront the adversary in the face of repression.

Many scholars consider resilience a crucial factor for campaign success, since it may determine the ability of the campaign to maintain its strategic advantage despite adversary oppression or attempts at co-optation (Bob and Nepstad 2007; Francisco 2004; Khawaja 1993; Koopmans 1993; Lichbach 1994; Moore 1998; Schock 2005; Weinstein 2007, 45). Continual regime counterattacks against a resistance campaign can remove key members of the campaign and raise the costs of continued participation among remaining members. States often use decapitation to undermine a campaign's organizational coherence over time.

A common assumption in security studies is that the ability to wage a successful war of attrition against a regime is a necessary determinant of resilience (Weinstein 2007, 37). Seizing territory or enjoying sanctuary from a neighboring state may allow violent insurgencies to meet two key challenges for resilience, maintaining their membership and recruitment operations in the face of state repression. Though their numbers may be smaller than mass nonviolent campaigns, violent insurgencies may be able to survive for decades, like the Karen insurgency in Burma, which has endured since 1949, and the FARC, which has waged guerrilla warfare against the Colombian state since 1964, and, for four decades (until their defeat in 2009), the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) waged a violent insurgency against the Sri Lankan central government. Although durable violent campaigns boast impressive stubbornness in the face of repressive and powerful adversaries, longevity does not necessarily translate into strategic success. Isolation in the countryside, in the mountains, or in neighboring safe havens does not necessarily afford violent insurgencies leverage over their state adversaries. The only reason why some violent insurgencies have been able to survive is that they operate

in remote areas not penetrated by the state, as with Taliban affiliates who maintain sanctuary in Pakistan's North-West Frontier.³⁷

Persistence may be necessary to campaign success, but it is insufficient. To achieve success, a campaign must go beyond persistence and achieve a shift in power between the opposition and the adversary. Resilience involves increasing mobilization and action, maintaining key assets and resources, and bringing a diverse constellation of assets and tactics to bear against the adversary, regardless of whether the adversary is materially more powerful. Successful campaigns endure despite regime repression while making tangible progress toward stated goals, even if those goals change over time. Because of the tendency of nonviolent campaigns to involve mass numbers of diverse participants, they should be better suited than violent campaigns to maintain resilience and continue their operations regardless of the adversary's actions. Regime crackdowns arguably debilitate armed campaigns more than similar crackdowns against unarmed campaigns, because of the greater number of potential assets and "weapons" available to nonviolent resistance campaigns. This argument, which we illustrate in the case studies, clearly challenges the conventional wisdom.

WHICH FACTORS MATTER MOST? EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF CIVIL RESISTANCE

We have demonstrated that civil resistance campaigns have routinely outperformed violent insurgencies. We have also theorized that the participation advantages that nonviolent resistance campaigns enjoy activate a series of mechanisms—sometimes in conjunction with one another and sometimes independently—that lead to success. Nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to pull apart the opponent's pillars of support rather than push them together; to divide rather than unify the opponent; and to raise the political, social, and economic costs to the regime rather than to the regime's opposition. We now demonstrate which of these factors seem most influential in determining failure and success.

Interestingly, as table 2.4 shows, there are different determinants of success based on the primary resistance type. Nonviolent campaigns (Model 2[b]) have been most successful when they have produced security-force defections.³⁸ In fact, such defections increase the likelihood of success by nearly 60 percent. The number of participants is also important for nonviolent campaigns. An increase of a single unit improves the odds of success by

nearly 10 percent. Notably, however, neither foreign state support, nor international sanctions, nor regime crackdowns seem to positively or negatively affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns.

What these results suggest is that domestic mechanisms are the most critical components of the success of nonviolent campaigns. Regime crackdowns often backfire and are therefore not necessarily determinants of campaign failure. While foreign support or international sanctions may have been critical in some cases, there is no general pattern indicating that they are necessary for successful campaign outcomes.

The results are especially striking when compared with the determinants of violent insurgent success (Model 3[b]). Security-force defections and the number of participants are much less important in predicting the success of violent insurgencies. Instead, the presence of a foreign state sponsor is the main determinant of success. For violent insurgencies, neither international sanctions nor violent crackdowns have systematic effects in determining success or failure, though they may matter in individual cases. The presence of a foreign state sponsor increases the likelihood of success by about 15 percent, controlling for other factors.

WHEN VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS SUCCEED: SOME KEY OUTLIERS

It is worth noting that there are some important deviations from our assumption that violent campaigns attract only limited numbers of participants. The Russian Revolution (1917), Chinese Revolution (1946–1950), Algerian Revolution (1954–1962), Cuban Revolution (1953–1959), and Vietnamese Revolution (1959–1975) come to mind as major examples of violent conflicts that did generate mass support sufficient to bring about revolutionary change. Such cases are key outliers to the argument that nonviolent campaigns are likelier than violent campaigns to galvanize mass participation.

Upon examining the revolutions, however, it is clear that many of the features common to successful nonviolent campaigns occurred in these revolutions, especially diverse, mass mobilization, which led to loyalty shifts within the ruling regimes' economic and military elites. They also often had direct material support from foreign states. These and other successful armed campaigns typically succeeded both in achieving the direct support of foreign sponsors and in building a strong base of popular support while creating parallel administrative, political, social, and economic structures.³⁹

The importance placed on mass mobilization and civilian noncooperation by scholars and theorists of revolutionary warfare suggests that the nonviolent components of successful armed campaigns are as significant—or possibly even more significant—than the military component.

We do not dispute, therefore, that violent insurgencies succeed. In fact, about 25 percent of the cases in our data set have succeeded. But violent insurgencies succeed at much lower rates than civil resistance campaigns, and one must consider the consequences of such victories, as we do in chapter 8. Although violent insurgencies captured power in some cases, the human costs were very high, with millions of casualties. Moreover, the conditions in these countries after the conflict ended have been overwhelmingly more repressive than in transitions driven by nonviolent civic pressure. In all five cases, the new regimes featuring the victorious insurgents were harsh to-ward civilian populations after the dust had settled, with retaliatory violence targeting supporters of the former regime and lack of respect for human rights and minority rights being the norm. None of these countries could be classified today as democratic.

Such trends are not limited to these five cases. In a recent study of sixtyseven regime transitions between 1973 and 2000, Ackerman and Karatnycky find that among the twenty cases where opposition or state violence occurred, only four (20 percent) qualified as "free" (according to 2005 Freedom House criteria) at the time of the study (2005, 19). On the other hand, among forty cases where the major forces pushing the transition were nonviolent civic coalitions, thirty-two (80 percent) were classified as "free" at the time of the study (2005, 19).

There are some clear theoretical reasons why successful nonviolent resistance leads to fewer civilian casualties and higher levels of democracy after the conflict than does successful violent resistance. Victorious violent insurgents often feel compelled to reestablish the monopoly on the use of force and therefore seek to purge any remaining elements of the state. Although they may seek to establish a democratic order, doing so will be difficult under circumstances of constant violent threat from regime holdovers. Even if the violent insurgency enjoyed mass support, the new state led by the former insurgents will quickly attempt to consolidate its power and remove the ability of the masses to rise up against it. Because the insurgents used violent methods to succeed in gaining power, there will be fewer inhibitions against the use of violent methods to maintain power. Indeed, the capacity to do so may only increase. Therefore, although violent insurgency sometimes works, the long-term consequences leave much to be desired.

As for nonviolent campaigns that succeed, it is likely that these successes will become reference points for those particular societies, and nonviolent resistance will be regarded as an effective method of transforming conflicts. This does not suggest that such states will become pacifist states or that serious human rights violations will never occur, but rather that the shift from noninstitutional to institutional types of nonviolent means of dealing with dissent will be easier, even when normal channels for resolving conflicts are blocked, ineffective, or in the hands of a hostile party.⁴⁰ At the same time, the way in which nonviolent resistance tends to decentralize power in society leads to a greater ability of the population to hold elites accountable.41 Scholars have long noted the positive impacts that a vibrant civil society can have on the quality of democracy (Putnam 1993). Opposition leaders that come to power via nonviolent resistance may feel the need to deliver public goods to the masses given that failure to respond to public demands may result in yet another ouster. In these ways, mass participation and mobilization through nonviolent action may contribute to a greater sense of trust and accountability when the conflict is over.

CONCLUSION

The primary aims of this chapter have been twofold. First, we argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns have been more successful at achieving higher and more diverse participation than violent insurgencies. Domestic mobilization is a more reliable source of power than foreign sponsorship, which most violent insurgencies must seek to pursue their ends. Second, we argue that large-scale participation often translates into tactical and strategic advantages, as the mass withdrawal of cooperation forces the regime to capitulate to the campaign's demands. The ability of nonviolent campaigns to mobilize a higher number of participants with a more diverse array of skills, abilities, and perspectives explains why they have been so successful at activating local mechanisms of change in their societies, including shifts in loyalty from the regime to the resistance and the ability to make regime repression backfire. The historic tendency of nonviolent movements to effectively compel regime loyalists to their side underscores the primacy of participation in generating the mechanisms that determine campaign victory or defeat.